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ABSTRACT 
Pressures rippling through the universe of overseas 
development aid over the last fifteen years are transforming 
overseas development aid from a top-down, government-only 
endeavor into a multi-layered, multi-party endeavor which 
engages governments and citizens at every level.  In addition, aid 
priorities now reflect the reality that global problems (such as 
climate change and HIV/AIDS) need serious attention and that 
developing countries need grant finance to address these problems 
and other problems that stem from abject poverty.  For the reasons 
described in this Article, these changes have made overseas 
development aid heavily dependent on grants channeled through 
the World Bank (referred to, throughout this article as “World 
Bank grants”).  This dependence poses challenges for an institution 
set up to provide loans, not grants, and accustomed to thinking of 
a grant as a form of gentleman’s agreement rather than a binding 
commitment which may range from hundreds of dollars to 
millions and which, whatever the amount, reflects a host of 
interests and voices that clamor to be heard.  These challenges set 
the context for this Article’s inquiry. 
This Article begins by describing the changes that recent trends 
in overseas development aid have wrought and the reasons those 
changes have placed the World Bank at center stage of 
development grant finance.  It then focuses on the legal framework 
governing World Bank grants.  Its key inquiry is the extent to 
which that framework facilitates and effectuates the goals and 
values that development grant finance aims to achieve.  This 
Article is not about whether grants for development aid achieve 
their targets (for example a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
in a recipient country or in the number of AIDS-related deaths), an 
important question but one for another day.  Rather, it is about 
whether such grants are negotiated, agreed to, and delivered in a 
                                                     
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
484 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
way that promotes the inclusive, participatory, and collaborative 
approaches that recent trends in development aid hold paramount. 
As a starting premise, this Article concedes that the legal 
framework governing development grant finance is unclear (an 
inevitable state of affairs given the lack of clarity surrounding the 
legal status of a grant in the national jurisdictions of most 
developed countries, and, therefore, in an international legal 
system built on principles drawn from them).  In the face of this 
lack of clarity the terms of the grant agreements, pursuant to which 
development grants are made, become the operative legal 
framework.  And so, this Article looks to those terms to determine 
whether such grants comport with current thinking on optimal 
development approaches. 
But not all terms of an agreement are created equal.  This 
Article posits that in the world of development grant finance, the 
key elements of a grant agreement to evaluate in order to 
determine whether the agreement reflects an inclusive, 
participatory, and collaborative approach are the elements that 
deal with the right of the grantor to cancel or suspend a grant and 
the provisions that apply when things go, or appear to have gone, 
wrong—namely the dispute resolution arrangements.  The grantor 
is always in a position of power; dispute resolution arrangements 
set the parameters within which such power may be exercised.  For 
this reason, this Article examines the dispute resolution 
arrangements in World Bank grant agreements. 
That examination reveals that World Bank grant agreements 
reflect a top-down, take it or leave it relationship that does not 
promote or facilitate inclusion, participation, and grantor/grantee 
collaboration.  This Article concludes with some suggestions for 
the principles that should guide the redress of these deficiencies 
and the re-design of the dispute resolution arrangements that is 
required. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Overseas development aid means many things to many people.  
Ever since such aid became a phenomenon, different sectors have 
competed for priority.  In the 1950s, for example, aid focused on 
post war reconstruction.  In the 1960s, the emphasis shifted to rural 
and agricultural development; in the 1980s it shifted again to the 
financial sector; and in the 2000s governance became the Holy 
Grail. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/2
2008] WORLD BANK GRANTS 485 
 
Attitudes about how aid should be delivered have also 
changed over time.  In the 1990s, certain fundamental changes in 
the world’s approach to aid occurred that cut across all sectors.  
Indeed, fear emerged among the developed countries of the impact 
global problems could have on them if such problems were left 
ignored in developing countries.  This shift in thinking led to a 
consensus that tackling global problems in developing countries 
should be a development priority.  These changes led to an 
exponential increase in the amount of overseas development aid 
that was made available in the form of grants (as distinct from 
loans or other financial instruments).  It also led to an expansion in 
the range of aid donors and in the range of direct recipients of aid.  
This in turn led to a change in expectations regarding the nature of 
the relationship between the donors and the recipients of aid.   
The implications of making global problems a development 
priority were far reaching.  First, it was clear that developed 
countries would have to provide developing countries grants if 
they wanted developing countries to address these problems.  
Currently, environmental concerns tend to be a priority for 
resource-starved developing countries.  And whilst HIV/AIDS 
might be a priority for some, the virility of the virus and the huge 
costs involved in providing adequate medicines and a health 
infrastructure to address it would quickly overwhelm even some 
of the more robust developing country economies. 
Second, such grant funding would have to be provided 
through multilateral, pooled funding mechanisms as global 
problems are not amenable to piecemeal, uncoordinated solutions. 
Therefore, developed countries wanted to pool the resources they 
were making available to address these problems in a central fund 
that would provide grants to developing countries on the basis of a 
coordinated platform that was continually informed by the latest 
research on how these problems should be tackled.  This desire to 
act collaboratively gave rise to a need for an entity that would 
manage the financial aspects of such a central fund which, at a 
minimum, involves collecting, holding, and investing the funds 
contributed to the central fund and then disbursing them in 
accordance with the donors’ intentions.  As an international 
financial institution with established links to the finance ministries 
and central banks of both developed and developing countries, the 
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World Bank1 was an obvious (though not uncontroversial) choice 
to fill that role.  Hence, the seeds of an increase in development 
grant finance, funded out of central funds administered by the 
World Bank and channeled through the World Bank, acting as a 
conduit for external donors, were sown. 
These seeds sprouted fast.  In 1991, the world’s major economic 
powers, including the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany, created a $1 billion global trust fund to 
provide grants to developing countries for environmental 
improvements, the “Global Environment Trust.”  Three years later, 
donors expanded and restructured the fund and it became the 
Global Environment Facility Trust Fund (“GEF Fund”), now a $3 
billion fund.  This was followed seven years later by the G-8 
countries’ creation of the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis (“Global Fund”), a $2 billion dollar fund to provide 
grants to developing countries to fund efforts to stall and treat 
those diseases.  And, more recently, in 2006, a group of 
government donors, including the European Union, China, and 
Australia, among others, created a multi-million dollar central 
fund to provide grant finance to developing countries for avian flu 
eradication efforts. 
Several additional implications flowed from the developed 
world’s embrace of global problems as a development priority.  
The strongest proponents of making the environment and 
HIV/AIDS development priorities were civil society groups and 
nongovernmental organizations in developed countries.  Not 
surprisingly, those groups also pressured for inclusive approaches 
to the design and delivery of aid.  Accordingly, in the case of the 
GEF, they fought for, and obtained, a seat at the table for 
developing countries, who participate with developed countries in 
deciding on the allocation of GEF grants.  Further, the GEF’s 
policies provide for extensive consultation with civil society 
groups, many of whom are heavily involved in implementing GEF-
funded projects. 
                                                     
1 The World Bank consists of two legally separate, but closely related, 
institutions; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“IBRD”), and the International Development Association (“IDA”).  They have 
distinct sources of funding but are both managed and operated day-to-day by the 
IBRD Board of Executive Directors and the IBRD President and staff.  See generally 
IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD (1991); WORLD 
BANK, 2007 ANNUAL REP. 4 (2007). 
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In the case of the Global Fund, civil society argued forcibly that 
that grants from that fund should be targeted to the grass roots 
level rather than government ministries.  In response, donors 
agreed to use in-county participatory governance mechanisms 
(“Country Coordinating Mechanisms”) which draw upon 
mechanisms already existing in recipient countries and facilitate 
reaching the grass-roots level.  In short, these global funds did not 
simply create a new source of multilateral funding to be provided 
as grants, they also created new norms for how development grant 
finance should be designed, delivered, and implemented. 
The vastness of the needs to be addressed and the relative 
paucity of government aid resources also underscored the 
importance of reaching out to non-government sources of 
development aid such as foundations and the private sector.  With 
this outreach, another new norm emerged: the building of public-
private partnerships for development grant finance, involving 
government and non-government actors both at the donor and the 
recipient level. 
With the dawning of the new millennium, the overseas 
development aid norms that evolved during the 1990s to tackle 
global problems spread more generally to other aspects of 
development aid.  In September 2000, 145 representatives of 
governments and the world’s leading development institutions 
met at the Millennium Assembly of the United Nations (“UN”) in 
New York to decide on a coordinated overseas development aid 
agenda for the new millennium.  They agreed on eight goals, the 
Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”), which include tackling 
global problems, building a “global partnership for development,” 
and achieving universal primary education, improved maternal 
health and reduced child mortality in an effort to eradicate extreme 
poverty. 
The adoption of these goals contained an implicit 
acknowledgement that further grant funding would be made 
available from the developed world for these purposes. This 
implicit acknowledgment took concrete form with the creation of 
the Education for All Fast Track Initiative which included a 
multimillion dollar trust fund set up by signatories of the 
Millennium Declaration, and administered by the World Bank, 
aimed at providing grant funding to the poorest developing 
countries for primary education. 
Prior to the creation of the global funds and the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals, the key tool for providing 
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multilateral assistance to the world’s poorest countries was the 
International Development Association (“IDA”), the arm of the 
World Bank Group which is funded by contributions from 
developed member countries of the World Bank (which are 
replenished on a regular replenishment cycle) and charged with 
the task of making highly concessional loans to the world’s poorest 
countries.  In 2001, however, the idea of helping the poorest 
countries by means of grants rather than loans that had been 
adopted in the case of the global funds and, to a considerable 
extent, for the achievement of the MDGs, gained further traction.  
This traction was fuelled by a separate, although related, trajectory: 
concern about mounting levels of unsustainable developing 
country debt. 
This concern had been growing since the mid 1980s.  In 2001, 
however, it came to a head when an International Financial 
Institutions Advisory Commission, set up by U.S. Congressional 
Republicans, suggested that IDA, should generally discontinue 
issuing loans and, instead issue grants.  This suggestion was not 
adopted by other IDA donors but it led, gradually, to an expanding 
set aside of a portion of IDA funds for grant assistance.  This 
culminated in 2005 in  an agreement amongst all IDA donors that 
certain developing countries should henceforth receive all IDA 
funding allocated to them (in accordance with a pre-agreed set of 
core criteria applicable to all countries eligible for IDA)  in the form 
of grants. 
As a consequence of these fundamental changes in overseas 
development aid that began in the 1990s and have continued into 
the new millennium, millions of dollars now pass annually from 
the developed world to the developing world in the form of World 
Bank grants.  Moreover, many parties including government and 
non-government donors and recipients are involved.  Further, a 
grant can take a multitude of forms, ranging from an IDA grant of 
several million dollars to a developing country government, to a 
grant of several hundred dollars from a trust fund administered by 
the World Bank to a non-governmental organization operating at 
the grass roots level. This exponential rise in grant finance poses 
new challenges for the World Bank, an institution set up to provide 
loans2, not grants, and for the international legal order.  
                                                     
2 Specifically, loans may be made to developing countries through the IBRD 
or the IDA. 
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The thesis of this Article is that the legal framework governing 
this grant finance is currently inadequate and that designing a 
dispute resolution mechanism for that framework should be the 
top priority in addressing those inadequacies, in chief because it 
sets the parameters for the donor-grantor relationship.  Further, 
this Article maintains that any such mechanism must contain a 
menu of options tailored to the expansive range of endeavors 
funded by World Bank grants.  In addition, the dispute resolution 
mechanism must be flexible and inclusive enough to meet the 
needs of the multiple stakeholders involved (governments, civil 
society, and the private sector) and responsive to the highly 
charged authorizing environment in which development aid is 
provided. 
This huge increase in development grant finance being 
channeled through the World Bank is an under-studied 
phenomenon in legal scholarship, although it has been widely 
studied in development economics.3  There is considerable legal 
scholarship on certain aspects of the trend, for example, the legal 
aspects of trust funds for the environment have been studied by 
international environment scholars.4  But the nature of the legal 
relationship between a grantor of aid and the recipient of such aid 
and the need for a process to manage disputes that arise in the 
course of such a relationship, have not been addressed.  This 
Article seeks to remedy that deficit. 
My starting premise is that the adequacy of the legal 
framework governing grants for development finance should be 
                                                     
3 See generally Jeremy Heimans, Multifactor Global Funds New Tools to Address 
Urgent Global Problems (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Res., Research paper No. 
2004/47); STEVEN RADELET, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT 
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA: PROGRESS, POTENTIAL, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE 
FUTURE (2004); Beryl A. Radin, Performance Measurement and Global Governance: The 
Experience of the World Bank, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REV. OF MULTILATERALISM 
AND INT’L ORGS. 25 (2007); JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC 
POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 210 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., Peter H. Sand, Trusts for the Earth: New International Financial 
Mechanisms for Sustainable Development in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 167, 167 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995) (articulating the history 
and development of the trust as a viable legal means for foreign aid and 
environmental protection); David Freestone, The Establishment, Role and Evolution 
of the Global Environment Facility: Operationalising Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility?, in LIBER AMICORUM FOR THOMAS A. MENSAH: LAW OF THE SEA, 
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 1077 
(Tafsir Malick Ndlaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
490 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
judged by the extent to which it advances the evolving overseas 
development aid paradigm that grant finance is designed to effect.  
As a threshold matter (and for reasons beyond the scope of the 
Article’s main focus), this Article takes the position that World 
Bank grants, which currently contain no governing law clause, 
should include such a clause, and that it should provide for the 
application of public international law.  Further, this Article favors 
specifying the sources of public law for such purposes in a manner 
which parallels the sources adopted in Article 38 of the 
International Court of Justice (i.e. treaties, custom, and general 
principles). 
Whilst favoring the application of public international law 
drawn from treaties, custom, and general principles as the 
preferred governing law for World Bank grants, this Article 
concedes that the legal status of promises to make donative 
transfers is inherently uncertain under public international law, 
reflective of the considerable uncertainty surrounding the legal 
status of donative transfers under the national jurisdictions of both 
donor and recipient countries.  Given the millions of dollars that 
change hands every year pursuant to development grant 
agreements, however, this Article maintains that the operative 
legal framework governing these grants consists of the terms and 
conditions of the grant agreements themselves.  Thus, for 
development purposes, the crucial question is whether the grant 
agreement defines the terms of engagement, and the grantor and 
recipients’ interaction for the duration of the grant in a way which 
is consistent with the shared values of partnership and 
collaboration that undergird the ideals of development grant 
financing.  Donors’ preference for providing aid by means of a 
World Bank grant is not only about providing assistance that does 
not increase developing country debt.  It’s also about providing 
assistance in a way that allows for partnership and collaboration 
between the donors, recipients, intermediaries like the World Bank, 
and other stakeholders. 
This Article maintains that the key elements of a grant 
agreement to evaluate in order to determine whether the 
agreement reflects an inclusive, participatory, and collaborative 
approach are the elements that deal with the power of the grantor 
to cancel or suspend a grant and the provisions that apply when 
things go, or appear to have gone, wrong—namely the dispute 
resolution arrangements.  These provisions set the parameters 
within which the power, which a grantor inevitably has vis-à-vis a 
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grantee, may be exercised. For this reason, this Article focuses 
primarily on the dispute resolution arrangements in World Bank 
grant agreements. 
A review of the legal framework governing World Bank grants 
shows that the framework falls short of what is needed.  Up until 
July 2006, many World Bank grants were made pursuant to grant 
agreements that contained no dispute resolution provisions at all.  
When, in 2006, concern increased regarding fraud and corruption 
as the size and scope of grants grew, the World Bank decided to 
introduce a set of standard conditions for all World Bank grants 
which included a dispute resolution provision. 
Instead of designing a customized provision to meet the 
distinct needs of the development grant universe, however, the 
Bank simply used the dispute resolution provision it uses for loans, 
all of which involve high-value, Bank-to-government transactions.  
This provision provides for a sui generis UNCITRAL-type 
procedure that does not contain any options or varying stages that 
can be tailored to the size of the grant, the capacity of the parties or 
the nature of the dispute.  Thus, the provision fails as an adequate 
dispute resolution mechanism for the diverse universe of World 
Bank grants. 
This Article maintains that the inadequacies of the current 
dispute resolution mechanisms in World Bank grant agreements 
are all the more problematic in light of some developments that 
have occurred in the wake of developed countries’ increased 
commitment to providing grant assistance.  These stem from the 
distinctive characteristics of a grant as compared to a loan.  With 
grants, there is always the fear that the grant funds will simply 
disappear.  Whilst loans may not ultimately be used for the 
purposes intended, the fact that they have to be paid back means 
that there is less concern that the funds lent will simply disappear.  
In response, to this concern regarding grant finance, donor 
countries have begun to insist that grant funds be made available 
on the basis of stringent performance benchmarks and a pre-
agreed results matrix.  Measuring results by effectiveness, as 
distinct from keeping track of loan repayments, invites ongoing 
dialogue between the grantor and recipient.  Making disbursement 
of grant proceeds dependent on the achievement of agreed 
measures of progress calls for collaboration and cooperation 
between the grantor and grantee and make it critical for the grant 
agreement to promote dialogue and understanding and a clear 
opportunity for all stakeholders to be heard.  That dialogue and 
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opportunity would be reflected in a well-designed dispute 
resolution mechanism. 
In addition, recent years have seen an increase in concern about 
fraud and corruption in all forms of overseas development aid, as 
well as concern about aid getting into the hands of terrorist groups.  
Further to this concern, donors have insisted on the inclusion of 
measures in World Bank grant agreements that will minimize the 
risk that grant funds will be diverted through fraud and corruption 
or somehow be siphoned off into the hands of terrorist groups.  In 
response the World Bank has introduced stringent provisions 
concerning fraud and corruption in its loan arrangements, which 
make the borrower liable for any fraud or corruption that occurs at 
any stage in the chain.  It has included the same kinds of 
provisions in its standard conditions for grants.  In such a climate 
of high vigilance, where the Bank is under pressure from donors 
and others to sanction at the first hint of a problem, the need for a 
robust dispute resolution mechanism becomes even more acute.  
Such a system can head off problems before they spiral, serving the 
interests of all parties concerned. 
Having found the existing dispute resolution mechanism in 
World Bank grant agreements lacking, this Article calls for a new 
approach, citing the elements that an adequate dispute resolution 
mechanism should contain.  These include (i) a range of 
procedures tailored to the nature of the dispute (with the stages of 
investigation and degrees of investigatory powers  adjusting 
accordingly); (ii) a sequenced set of procedures (which would 
begin with consultation and progress, as necessary through 
negotiation, mediation, fact-finding, and arbitration); (iii) means of 
empowering recipients where appropriate to enable them to 
participate in a meaningful way (such means could include ways 
of enabling them to supplement their skills and, in some instances, 
making representation available to them).  Further, this Article 
maintains that any dispute resolution system should be 
transparent but time bound (to avoid protracted proceedings 
which could have a negative impact on the case for overseas 
development aid generally) and that representatives of all 
stakeholders should be consulted in its design. 
The first part of Section 2 of this Article traces the emergence of 
the World Bank grant as an instrument of overseas development 
aid.  Section 2 shows how the changes in development norms that 
began to occur in the 1990s led donor countries to create 
centralized funds under the umbrella of the World Bank as 
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administrator and trustee.  These changes in norms included 
recognition of the  need to address global problems through 
coordinated, multilateral initiatives; a collective acknowledgement 
that certain aspects of development require grant finance not loans; 
a renewed donor commitment to eradicating abject poverty; a new 
openness to building partnerships with non-governmental entities, 
including civil society and the private sector both to fund 
development initiatives and to implement them; and a 
determination to enhance accountability in overseas development 
assistance through the use of performance targets and results 
management measures. 
The second part of Section 2 shows how early suggestions that 
the IDA provide a portion of its assistance in the form of grants 
evolved over a period of ten years into a decision to provide all 
IDA funds allocated to debt distressed countries by way of grants.  
I show how the basic premises underlying this change in the IDA’s 
policies mirrored those underlying the explosion in the creation of 
many central funds to provide grant assistance—namely, concern 
about developing countries’ levels of debt and a determination to 
tie continued support to “good” performance, which, in the context 
of IDA, means progress in attaining transparency and 
accountability in government. 
Having traced the emergence of the World Bank grant as a 
financing mechanism, this Article, in Section 3, shows how World 
Bank grants have become a core part of development finance and 
how they span a vast range of activities that vary greatly in 
purpose, size, and scope and in the nature of the parties involved.  
It shows how grants funded from special purpose central funds, 
IDA, and grant programs funded out of World Bank net income  
fall into several  broad categories which include grants to 
safeguard global public goods, grants dedicated to fund the social 
sectors in the ongoing effort to relieve poverty,  grants to provide 
relief in the event of a crisis or to meet the needs of societies in war-
torn post-conflict situations, and grants to jump start innovative 
financing initiatives (such as output-based aid schemes and crop 
insurance). 
Recognizing the varied range of activities and actors that come 
within the World Bank grant umbrella and the very differing scope 
and scale that such grants involve, Section 4 of this Article explores 
the legal framework governing such grants.  Conceding that the 
legal status of grants is uncertain, it points to the terms and 
conditions of the agreements wich govern World Bank grants as 
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the operative legal framework that defines the relationship 
between the parties involved.  Analyzing those terms and 
conditions, which vest the World Bank with extensive powers to 
suspend or cancel a grant, Section 4 then reviews whether such 
agreements include a dispute resolution mechanism that reflects 
the values of the donors or grant finance, serves to protect 
recipients against heavy handed or peremptory action on the part 
of the World Bank, and facilitates dialogue, negotiation, and 
reconciliation if a problem arises. 
Section 4 concludes that the dispute resolution mechanism in 
World Bank grants, which is drawn from the heterogeneous large-
value transfers world of World Bank loans, reflects a heavy-
handed top-down approach which is out of sync with current 
development aid norms.  It urges that a new dispute resolution 
system be designed for World Bank grants which contains a menu 
of options tailored to the idiosyncrasies of the World Bank grant 
universe.  In particular, I urge that any such mechanism help to re-
adjust, or equalize, grantor/grantee leverage by taking into 
account the continuing nature of many World Bank grant 
relationships, the David and Goliath syndrome that’s a fact of life 
for most parties dealing with the World Bank, and the fact that 
World Bank grants involve multiple stakeholders in a sensitive 
authorizing environment. 
This Article concludes by noting that the trends that have led to 
the explosion in the use of grant finance are here to stay.  
Accordingly, developing effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
for World Bank grants will meet an important policy need.  
Overseas development aid is a high stakes endeavor both for the 
tax payers of donor governments and the citizens of recipient 
countries whose needs far exceed the supply of funds available.  
This makes it incumbent on the legal regime to foster workable and 
responsive legal relationships. Fostering such relationships implies 
anticipating stressors and building a process that allows for 
investigation and aversion of problems before they morph into 
scandals with the potential to de-rail the broader aid effort. 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORLD BANK GRANT AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AID 
2.1. Background:  Loans and Grants in Context 
To understand the significance of the grants for overseas 
development aid that are channeled through the World Bank 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss2/2
2008] WORLD BANK GRANTS 495 
 
(“World Bank grants”), the terms and conditions on which they are 
given and the need for robust dispute resolution mechanisms to 
process differences when things go wrong, it is first necessary to 
understand where such grants fit in the overseas development aid 
architecture. 
2.1.1. Overseas Development Aid Defined 
World Bank grants are part of the financial assistance provided 
to developing countries5 by a network of national and international 
aid agencies, programs, and related institutions that together 
constitute what is known as overseas development aid  (a term 
used interchangeably with overseas development assistance)6  
Overseas development aid traces its historical beginnings to the 
development activities of the colonial powers in their overseas 
territories, the institutions and programs for economic cooperation 
created under United Nations auspices after the Second World 
War, the United States Point Four Program,7 and the large-scale 
support for economic stability for the countries on the periphery of 
the Communist bloc of that era.8 
Multilateral overseas development aid emerged as a form of 
international finance in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, when the forty-four allied nations met at the United 
                                                     
5 For the purposes of this Article a developing country is a country in which 
the majority of the population lives on significantly less money than the 
population in highly industrialized countries and often lacks basic public services. 
6 See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], The Story of Official Development 
Assistance: A History of the Development Assistance Committee and the Development 
Co-operation Directorate In Dates, Names and Figures, at 22, OCDE/GD(94)67 (1996) 
(prepared by Helmut Führer), available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/39 
/1896816.pdf (defining ODA as “official transactions with the main objective of 
promoting the economic and social development of developing countries . . . the 
financial terms of which are ‘intended to be concessional in character’”).  Note, the 
World Bank also channels grants to the developing world from non-government 
sources, such as, for example, the Gates Foundation and the Soros Foundation, 
when such sources pool their contributions with other contributors in programs 
being administered by the World Bank.  To that extent, references to overseas 
development aid made in this Article encompass assistance provided by a broader 
range of sources than Overseas Development Assistance as defined by the OECD. 
7 The United States Point Four Program is a program for development 
assistance introduced by President Truman in 1949 and endorsed by Congress in 
1950 with the enactment of the Act for International Development.  Point Four 
Program, 64 Stat. 204 (1950). 
8 OECD, supra note 6, at 21 (providing a history of the development of ODA). 
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Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, 
New Hampshire and created the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (“World Bank”) and the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) pursuant to the Bretton 
Woods Treaty.9  The World Bank was originally set up to assist in 
reconstructing the economies of its members destroyed by war.10  
The IMF was set up to oversee the international monetary system 
and promote stable exchange rates.  The creation of these 
institutions was followed in 1950 by the establishment of the 
United Nations following the United Nations Conference in San 
Francisco in 1945 when representatives of fifty nations agreed to 
the United Nations Charter, whose purposes include promoting 
the economic and social advancement of all peoples.11 
Bilateral overseas development aid as a form of international 
finance gained momentum somewhat later.  The United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France were the first countries to create 
formal bilateral overseas development assistance agencies. 12  In the 
1960s, many other countries, including Japan, Germany, and 
Sweden followed suit, prompted by former colonies beginning to 
attain their independence.  The former colonial powers were eager 
to maintain strong ties with their former colonies on which they 
still depended heavily for the supply of commodities and raw 
materials.  Thus, they had a strong interest in the financial 
sustainability of these newly minted states and created aid 
                                                     
9 See generally International Monetary Fund [IMF], IMF Archives: Finding 
Aids—Bretton Woods Conference Collection—Bretton Woods Conference Files, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/arc/eng/fa/BWC/s4.htm (discussing the 
origins of the IMF) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); World Bank, Archives: World Bank 
History, http://go.worldbank.org/2GIYUD9KB0 (discussing the origins of the 
World Bank) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
10 David D. Driscoll, IMF, The IMF and the World Bank: How Do They Differ?, at 
1 (1996), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.pdf. 
11 UN CHARTER pmbl. 
12 In 1945, “the United Kingdom reorganis[ed] its development assistance 
through the ‘Colonial Development and Welfare Act’ (following previous acts 
passed in 1929 and 1940)” and “France establish[ed] the Fonds d’investissement 
économique et social des territoires d’outre-mer.”  OECD, supra note 6, at 4–5.  In 
1951, the United States passed the Mutual Security Act, which provided for major 
aid programs for South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, India, 
Iran, Jordan, and Pakistan, to be administered by a new Mutual Security Agency, 
reconstituted from the Economic Cooperation Agency which had administered 
the Marshall Plan.  Mutual Security Act of 1951, ch. 479, 65 Stat. 373–387 (1951); 
OECD, supra note 6, at 6. 
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agencies charged with the task of administering programs of 
overseas development aid to them.13  The United States and 
Canada, meantime, sought to advance their strategic interests.  
Canada created an external aid office in 1960, which subsequently 
became the Canadian International Development Aid Agency in 
1968.  The United States created the Agency for International 
Development and the Peace Corps, and launched the Alliance for 
Progress, a ten-year program of cooperation with Latin America.14 
These bilateral efforts were accompanied by additional, 
multilateral efforts, most notably, the creation of IDA in 1960, 
which was set up by member countries of the World Bank for the 
purpose of providing highly concessional loans to the poorest 
developing countries, most, if not all, of which were former 
colonies.15 
2.1.2. Overseas Development Aid Norms (1960s–1990s) 
Developed countries continue to provide their overseas 
development aid through a mix of bilateral and multilateral 
channels.  Bilateral aid is aid provided directly by a donor country 
to a recipient country—for example, from France to Cameroon.  
Bilateral aid arrangements may take a variety of forms, including 
commitments from the developed country government to provide 
goods and services such as food, medical supplies, or technical 
assistance to the developing country government and direct 
financial assistance. 16  Grants are the preferred form of bilateral 
financial assistance.17 
                                                     
13 In 1961, France established a Ministry for Co-operation with responsibility 
“for assistance to independent, mainly African developing countries;” Germany 
established a comprehensive development assistance program, including creating 
a separate ministry for development assistance; Japan set up the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund to provide loans to developing countries and, the 
following year, created an Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency, Sweden 
created an Agency for International Assistance (transformed in 1965 into the 
Swedish International Development Authority); Switzerland created a technical 
cooperation service within its Department of Foreign Affairs.  OECD, supra note 6, 
at 13. 
14 OECD, supra note 6, at 13 (citing the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. 
No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424). 
15 See IDA, What is IDA?, http://go.worldbank.org/ZRAOR8IWW0 
(describing the establishment and goals of the IDA) (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
16 The United Kingdom Department for International Development [DFID] 
provides its overseas development aid in the form of commitments to provide 
goods and services and does not provide financial assistance directly to the 
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Multilateral aid is the overseas development aid a country 
channels through intergovernmental organizations like the World 
Bank and the United Nations.  Like bilateral aid, it can take a 
variety of forms.  In order to become a member of the World Bank, 
for example, member countries subscribe shares and commit to 
making good on World Bank financial obligations in the event the 
World Bank’s is unable to do so.18  Those subscriptions and 
commitments constitute overseas development aid even though 
they are mostly in the form of callable obligations.19  Through the 
financial backing of its member countries, the World Bank is 
enabled to raise funds by issuing bonds on the international capital 
markets.20  Those bonds are the World Bank’s source of cash for the 
loans it makes to developing countries.21  Member countries’ 
contributions to IDA also constitute overseas development aid.  
Unlike member subscriptions to World Bank shares, contributions 
to IDA involve the transfer of hard cash from the donor country to 
IDA every three years.  Until 2005, IDA conveyed the bulk of its 
assistance to developing countries by way of loans. 
In sum, therefore, up until the early 1990s, the overseas 
development aid landscape had well defined parameters.  It 
consisted primarily of government-to-government transactions.  
These could be bilateral arrangements involving the transfer of 
                                                                                                                        
developing country recipient.  See DFID, About DFID: Who DIFID Works With 
(Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/ (describing 
bodies and agencies that comprise the DFID “global aid ‘system’”).  USAID also 
uses this modality of assistance along with several other modalities.  See USAID, 
Doing Business with USAID (May 4, 2007), http://www.usaid.gov/business/ 
(describing the acquisition and assistance instruments used to attain USAID 
objectives). 
17 Daniel Cohen, Pierre Jacquet, & Helmut Reisen, Beyond “Grants versus 
Loans”: How to Use ODA and Debt for Development 1–2 (2005) (paper prepared 
for AFD/EUDN International Conference), http://www.pierrejacquet.net/IMG 
/pdf/Cohen_Jacquet_Reisen_EUDN_final.pdf.  A few donor governments, 
however, most notably Japan, provide assistance in the form of loans.  France and 
Italy provide a small percentage of their overseas development assistance in the 
form of loans.  Id. at 2. 
18 IBRD, Information Statement, at 2–4 (2006), http://treasury.worldbank.org 
/web/InformationStatementFinal.pdf. 
19 Id at 2. 
20 Id. at 4.  Because World Bank bonds have the financial backing of all the 
developed countries of the world, they are rated AAA and are favored 
investments of banks seeking to satisfy reserve requirements and other 
institutional investors.  Id. at 35. 
21 Id. 
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either services, tangibles (such as food aid), or funds from a 
developed country government to a developing country 
government.  Where the transfer involved funds, they would, in 
almost all cases, be conveyed to the developing country as a grant.  
Multilateral aid, on the other hand, involved conveying assistance 
to the developing world through an intermediary, an 
intergovernmental organization such as the U.N. or the World 
Bank, which was conveyed to developing countries was conveyed 
(with some minor exceptions)22 in the form of loans. 
2.1.3. Changes in Overseas Development Aid Norms (1990s–
Present) 
Starting in the 1990s, an explosion in donors’ use of  trust funds 
to convey grant aid to developing countries for special purposes;23 
and a change in the nature of the assistance IDA should provide to 
debt distressed countries materially altered the pre-1990s 
bilateral/multilateral, grants/loans parameters for overseas 
development aid and gave rise to the phenomenon of the World 
Bank grant. 
The changes that occurred in overseas development aid norms 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s were fuelled by several 
competing forces.  In the beginning of the 1990s, national budgets 
for overseas development aid declined in the face of widespread 
questioning about aid’s effectiveness.24  Criticism of multilateral 
institutions like the World Bank, the U.N., and the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) was rampant and they became a favored 
target of anti-globalization protesters.25  At the same time, concern 
                                                     
22 The World Bank served as trustee of some minor trust funds prior to the 
1990s.  Joseph Gold, Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the 
International Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 856, 859–61 
(1978); Sand, supra note 4, at 167. 
23 World Bank, A Management Framework for World Bank Administered Trust 
Funds, at 1 (2007), available at http://go.worldbank.org/OHJ0PRQF90 [hereinafter 
TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT]. 
24 See Jean-David Naudet, Comment, in DEVELOPMENT AID: WHY AND HOW? 
TOWARDS STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVENESS 97, 102–103 (2005), available at 
http://www.afd.fr/jahia/webdav/site/afd/users/administrateur/public/public
ations/notesetdocuments/ND-22.pdf (reviewing cross-country econometric 
analyses, performed in the mid-1990s, of the effectiveness of development aid and 
highlighting the “[a]id fatigue” of “political authorities, public opinion and even 
the development community”). 
25 See Anup Shah, Public Protests Around the World, GLOBAL ISSUES, Nov. 25, 
2003, available at http://www.globalissues.org/article/45/public-protests-
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increased about global problems, such as pollution and the spread 
of HIV/AIDS which underscored the deep need for aid.  It became 
clear that these problems threatened to engulf the developed world 
if left unchecked in the developing world.  It was also clear that 
developing countries needed grant finance to  address these 
problems as they had neither the will nor (in many cases) the 
capacity to address them themselves. 26  Over time, concern about 
how best to address global problems in developing countries 
expanded into a broader concern about the need for more grant 
finance generally as the crippling effects of developing country 
debt became increasingly apparent.  In the face of these competing 
sentiments, pressure mounted to explore new approaches to 
overseas development aid. 
In response to these pressures, several new, inter-linked trends 
emerged.  These included: (i) a proliferation of trust funds for 
overseas development aid designed to target aid to specific issues 
and policy areas, and to allow for participatory rather than top-
down development; (ii) an effort to create partnerships for 
development aid whereby government and non-government 
donors combine resources to make grants available for 
development challenges; and (iii) a determination to change 
development aid to the world’s poorest countries from loans to 
grants.  Each of these trends has had a major impact on the amount 
of overseas development aid being made available to the 
developing world in the form of World Bank grants. 
2.2.  The Rise of the World Bank Grant:  Trust Funds 
2.2.1. The Impact of Donors’ Preference for Trust Funds  
An unprecedented and exponential growth in the use of the 
trust fund as a mechanism for overseas development aid, which 
began in the 1990s and still continues, 27 has led to a huge increase 
in World Bank grants because donors usually rely on the World 
                                                                                                                        
around-the-world (reporting on the large protests at WTO meetings, at IMF, 
World Bank, G8, and other summits against globalization and increasing 
disparities between the rich and poor). 
26 Heimans, supra note 3, at 2–4; RADELET, supra note 3, at 4. 
27 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at i.  In the early 1990s, the 
World Bank held about two billion dollars in trust funds.  By 2007, this amount 
had risen to over twenty-one billion dollars.  Id.  It continues to rise with the Bank 
now serving as trustee to some seven hundred sixty-six different trusts.  Id. at 10–
11. 
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Bank to serve as trustee for such grants.  The growth in the use of 
such trust funds began with the creation of trust funds to protect 
global public goods.  It subsequently expanded to include the use 
of trust funds to target specific sectors or issues, to provide funds 
for debt relief, and as vehicles for creating a pool of funds drawn 
from a wide range of government and non-government donors.  
Trust funds are also commonly used to pilot new initiatives.  These 
uses are in addition to the trust fund’s traditional use as a vehicle 
for mobilizing resources for crisis relief, humanitarian needs, and 
post-conflict resources.  Most trust funds for overseas development 
are created to provide grant financing to developing countries and 
so more trust funds means more grant finance. 
Donors choose the trust fund mechanism as an alternative 
approach to providing development aid for several reasons.  The 
trust fund affords donors a way to pool their resources with those 
of other donors for a common purpose, pursuant to an agreed 
agenda.28  It also gives donors a way of retaining active, ongoing 
control over the use of their aid resources because when donors 
create a trust fund with other donors, the trust arrangement 
usually provides that the donors, acting together as a donor 
council, will decide on the allocation of the trust fund resources.29  
Thus, although the World Bank administers the trust fund as 
trustee, the donors will often call the shots on the specific 
allocations of trust fund resources.  This gives donors more direct 
control and influence over the use of their funds than they have 
within the governance structures of institutions like the World 
Bank and the UN. 
2.2.1.1. Global Trust Funds 
For global issues, such as the environment and HIV/AIDS, for 
example a coordinated donor-controlled approach was seen as 
crucial for effectiveness.  The donors to the GEF Fund were 
skeptical of the World Bank’s commitment to protecting the 
environment in 1994 and the donors to the Global Fund did not 
trust any intergovernmental organization to rely on grass roots 
                                                     
28 See generally Sand, supra note 4. 
29 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 17 (“Many of these funds are 
implemented in the context of partnership governance agreements that are 
designed to be broadly representative and often external to the Bank (for instance, 
the GEF Council has 32 constituencies representing 177 countries).”).  See generally 
Sand, supra note 4, at 180. 
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networks in 2000.  Hence, they created new trust funds to direct 
resources at these issues instead of seeking to utilize the regular 
channels of existing multilateral institutions.30  The creation of the 
first global funds, the GEF Fund and the Global Fund, illustrated 
the advantages of the trust fund approach for donors and paved 
the way for a subsequent plethora of special purpose trust funds 
for development. 31 
2.2.1.1.1. The GEF Fund 
Set up as a pilot initiative in 1991, with about one billion dollars 
in funding (and subsequently restructured in 1994), the GEF Fund 
was designed to help developing countries meet the costs involved 
in meeting their obligations under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Biological Diversity.32  The GEF Fund’s 
largest contributors are the United States, Japan, France, and 
Germany.33  It now holds over three billion dollars, contributed by 
thirty-four countries.34  Although the Instrument establishing the 
GEF Fund authorizes assistance in several forms including loans, 
guarantees, and grants, most of its resources are conveyed to 
developing countries by way of grant.35  The GEF Fund also serves 
as a precedent for ongoing proposals to set up additional global 
                                                     
30 Sand, supra note 4, at 168–75. 
31 See Global Environment Facility [GEF], About the GEF, http://www 
.gefweb.org/interior.aspx?id=50 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (explaining the 
objectives of GEF); see also GEF, Conventions, http://www.gefweb.org/interior 
.aspx?id=108 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (listing international environmental 
conventions which provide “broad strategic guidance” to the GEF Council). 
32 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 9, 1992, 
1771 U.N.T.S. 107; Convention on Biological Diversity, Jun. 5, 1992, 1769 U.N.T.S. 
79.  It now also serves as the financial mechanism for the Convention to Combat 
Desertification and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants. 
33 GEF Council, Trustee Report, at 11, GEF/C.34/Inf.3 (Nov. 7, 2008), available 
at http://www.gefeo.org/uploadedFiles/Documents/ Council_Documents 
__(PDF_DOC)/GEF_C34/C.34.Inf.3%20Trustee%20Report.pdf. 
34 GEF, GEF Structure and Organization (Dec. 18, 2007), http://www 
.gefcountrysupport.org/report_detail.cfm?projectId=200; Press Release, GEF, 
World Environment Body Gets A US$ 3.13 Billion Boost (Aug. 28, 2006), 
http://thegef.org/uploadedFiles/External_Affairs/Media/GEF_4th 
_Replenishment_Final.pdf. 
35 Instrument of the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment 
Facility arts. I(2), I(9)(b)–(c), Mar. 2008, available at http://thegef.org 
/uploadedFiles/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf. 
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trust funds to finance activities aimed at combating the effects of 
global climate change.36  These proposals further the trend of 
having grant finance serve a critical role in the protection of the 
environment in developing countries. 
2.2.1.1.2. The Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and 
Tuberculosis 
The idea of having a global fund to provide grant financing to 
developing countries to protect the environment was followed by 
the idea of creating a global fund to provide grant financing to 
address issues of global health.  The leaders of the G8 countries 
acknowledged in July 2000 that HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria threatened to “reverse decades of development and to rob 
an entire generation of hope for a better future.”37 
Beyond the acknowledgement, the leaders of the twenty-eight 
G8 Summit agreed to implement a comprehensive plan on 
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.38  Then-U.N. Secretary 
General, Kofi Annan, initiated the idea of creating a global fund 
dedicated to the battle against these diseases in April 2001 at a 
special summit of the Organization of African Unity held in Abuja, 
Nigeria, where it received strong support from African leaders.39  
                                                     
36 For example, the GEF Fund has paved the way for a joint proposal from 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan to create two additional multi-
billion dollar global funds, the Strategic Climate Fund, and the Clean Technology 
Fund to provide grants to developing countries for activities aimed at addressing 
climate change.  This proposal was announced at the Thirteenth Session of the 
Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.  Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–14, 2003,  Report of the Co-Facilitators of The 
Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by Enhancing 
Implementation of the Convention, para. 1, FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1 (Dec. 14, 
2007). 
37 Communiqué of Okinawa G8 Summit, Okinawa, Jap., July 23, 2000, para. 
26, available at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2000okinawa/finalcom.htm. 
38 See Chair’s Summary of Kananaskis G8 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta, Jun. 
27 2002, available at http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/g8 
_documents/archives_from_previous_summits/kananaskis_summit_-
_2002/the_kananaskis_summit_chair_s_summary.html (summarizing the annual 
Summit discussion of, among other things, terrorism, sustainable development 
and Africa’s development). 
39 See Press Release, U.N. Info. Serv., United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan Calls for Large-Scale Mobilization in Fight Against AIDS (Apr. 25, 2001), 
available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2001/note137.html 
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Subsequently, in June 2001, the creation of a “global HIV/AIDS 
and health fund to finance an urgent and expanded response to the 
epidemic” was announced at the close of the U.N. General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS.40 
Kofi Annan appealed to countries and the private sector to 
contribute to the fund.  In July 2001, at a meeting of the G8 
countries in Genoa, leaders of the G8 vowed to make the fund 
operational by the end of the year and established a working group 
charged with the task of developing a new structure and 
methodology that would enable the fund to spend resources most 
cost-effectively and in ways that would produce measurable 
results.41 
Advocates for the Global Fund campaigned for, and secured, a 
facility targeted towards reaching recipients at the grass roots 
level.42  To further the intention of creating a fund that would reach 
the grass roots level and be quick and non-bureaucratic, donors set 
the fund up as an independent, nonprofit foundation.43  It is set up 
under Swiss law with headquarters in Geneva.44  The World Bank 
serves as trustee of all monies entrusted to the Global Fund.  The 
                                                                                                                        
(discussing Annan’s statements to the African Summit about how to wage an 
effective global campaign against AIDS). 
40 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, G.A. Res. S-26/2, ¶ 90, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/S-26/2 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
41 Communiqué of Genoa G8 Summit, Genoa, It., July 22, 2001, ¶ 15, available 
at http://www.g8italia.it/_en/docs/XGKPT170.htm. 
42 See ALEXANDER SHAKOW, GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND 
MALARIA [Global Fund] & WORLD BANK GLOBAL HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS, 
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE STUDY (2006) (discussing the role of the Global Fund 
and World Bank in addressing the “implementation crisis” that arises when large 
international organizations attempt to address public health problems at the 
national level); see also First Meeting of the Transitional Working Group to 
Establish a Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Brussels, Belg., 
Oct. 11–12, 2001,  Final Report (Oct. 30, 2001) (discussing whether the GEF will be 
formally or informally established, and if formally, under which nation’s law); 
Third Meeting of the Transitional Working Group to Establish a Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, Brussels, Belg., Dec. 13–14, 2001, Final 
Report (establishing an oversight committee). 
43 Fifth Board Meeting of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and 
Malaria, Geneva, Switz., Jun. 5–6, 2003, Report of the Governance and Partnership 
Committee, Annex 6, Update on Legal Status for the Global Fund [hereinafter 
Global Fund’s Fifth Board Meeting, Annex 6]. 
44 Global Fund, History of the Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en 
/history/?lang=en (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) 
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Global Fund made its first round of grants in April 2002, for the 
benefit of a total of thirty-six countries.45 
2.2.1.1.3. The Avian and Human Influenza Facility 
More recently, in 2006, the global trust fund approach to 
garnering support for global health needs was adopted with the 
creation of the Avian and Human Influenza Facility.46  Created at 
an international pledging conference held in Beijing in 2006, the 
purpose of the facility is to provide grants for actions that will 
minimize the risk and socio-economic impact of avian influenza 
(and other zoonoses) and of possible human pandemic influenza.47  
It is funded by a group of government donors, including China, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation among 
others, whose pledged commitments amount to eighty-three 
million dollars.48 
2.2.1.2.   Other Trust Funds 
Even for issues that do not have a global reach, donors have 
come to believe that increased donor control allows for a more 
efficient and less bureaucratic form of aid that will be mobilized 
faster than aid from multilateral channels.  However accurate the 
perception, trust funds are seen as magnets for raising funds from 
public and private sources because they create a sense of urgent 
and focused attention on a particular issue.49 
Donors also like the ability to customize the governance 
structure of a trust fund as a way of creating multilateral aid 
initiatives which involve multiple stakeholders including non-
governmental organizations and the private sector in decision-
making, financing, and implementation responsibilities.  Finally, 
donors favor trust funds because they are perceived as more 
amenable to being held accountable for results.  Indeed, funds 
donated to a trust fund are seen (and sold to taxpayers) as more 
                                                     
45 Global Fund, Funding Decisions, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en 
/fundingdecisions/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
46 For more information on the Avian and Human Influenza Facility, see 
generally World Bank, Avian and Human Influenza Facility, 
http://go.worldbank.org/D805PSGGI0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
47 Id. 
48 Id.  The other donors to the Facility include Iceland, Estonia, Korea, and 
Slovenia. 
49 Heimans, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
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traceable than monies that become part of the maw of an existing 
intergovernmental organization.50  All such trust funds rely 
heavily, however, on the financial infrastructure of existing 
institutions, and nine times out of ten, that means channeling the 
trust fund resources through the World Bank.51 
2.2.2. The Impact of Donors’ Renewed Commitment to Relieving 
Abject Poverty 
Fueled by prosperous times, the beginning of the new 
millennium was marked by optimism about overseas development 
aid, which led to an increase in development grant finance.52  In 
2000, the United States’ economy was booming, there was 
economic progress in India, China, and Russia, and “the IT boom 
was still in its full glory.”53  While Africa “remained a place of 
unrelieved crisis,” there was hope that the wealth, new technology, 
and new global interconnectedness and awareness with which the 
developed world entered the twenty-first century could make a 
difference to the vexing challenges of environmental degradation, 
illness, and abject poverty.54 
In September 2000, at a meeting of most of the world’s 
governments and its leading development institutions at the 
Millennium Assembly of the United Nations in New York, this 
optimism and determination was formalized through the adoption 
of the Millennium Development Goals (“MDGs”).55  The MDGs, 
which are set out in the Millennium Declaration, reflect the 
agreement on priorities for overseas development aid in the 
twenty-first century.56  They include (i) the eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger, (ii) universal primary education, (iii) 
promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, (iv) 
reduced child mortality, (v) improved maternal health, (vi) the 
                                                     
50 Id. at 7–8. 
51 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 1. 
52 SACHS, supra note 3, at 210. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 211. 
56 See U. N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 
(Sept. 18 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration 
/ares552e.pdf; see also United Nations, U.N. Millennium Development Goals, 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/statements.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008).  The meeting included 147 heads of state and government.  SACHS, supra 
note 3, at 210. 
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combat against HIV, AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, (vii) 
environmental sustainability, and (viii) the development of a 
global partnership for development.57 
The year 2015 was chosen as the year by which the MDGs 
should be achieved, and the UN subsequently set a global 
monitoring system in place whereby countries’ progress towards 
achievement of the goals are reviewed and reported on annually.58  
Developed country governments confirmed their commitment to 
the Millennium Declaration in 2002 at a conference held in 
Monterrey, Mexico to discuss ways of providing the financial 
means necessary to implement the goals and agreed to make 
concrete efforts to increase their assistance.59  Donors have been 
eager to show progress on the highly visible aid platform they 
agreed to in 2000 and since that time, have dedicated much of their 
aid to achieving the MDGs, frequently by contributing resources to 
trust-funded global programs managed by the World Bank.60All 
such assistance is then provided to recipients in the form of 
grants.61 
2.2.3. The Impact of New Donor Partnerships  
The eighth MDG, the goal of creating partnerships for 
development, reflected an explicit recognition by developed 
countries and development institutions that governments alone 
                                                     
57 United Nations, U.N. Millennium Development Goals, 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/statements.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008). 
58 Id. 
59 SACHS, supra note 3, at 217–18 (discussing the “Monterrey Consensus”). 
60 Press Release, U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Progress Towards Dev. Targets is 
Mixed, UN Finds, U.N. Doc. DPI/2464 A (July 2, 2007), available at 
www.unescap.org/unis/press/2007/jul/MDGs_report07_global_pr.pdf.  See 
generally Mukesh Kapila, Healing Broken Societies: Can Aid Buy Love and Peace? in 13 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INT’L ORGS. 17, 19–23 
(2007) (evaluating the practicality and efficacy of using international aid to 
encourage peace and security in the receiving countries); Radin, supra note 3, at 
25–33 (describing the World Bank’s dual strategy of employing both a “bottom-up 
process” of “civic engagement” and a “top-down effort that emphasize[s] 
efficiency outcomes and market-based solutions” in its performance activities). 
The merits of this approach of providing aid to specific development goals have 
been questioned as it has led to a fragmented aid landscape and a host of 
programs with highly specific mandates, each providing narrowly targeted 
assistance.  Id. 
61 See Heimans, supra note 3, at 1. 
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cannot accomplish development and that broad-based 
partnerships are necessary to make progress.  Recognizing that 
development demands collaboration with many actors has two 
aspects: collaborating with a wide range of recipients who may 
implement activities on behalf of the aid’s ultimate beneficiaries 
(the world’s poor) rather than confining the aid relationship to 
country governments; and reaching out to multiple possible 
sources of funds for development in recognition of the fact that 
official aid alone will never be sufficient to meet all the needs of the 
developing world.62 
Further to this second aspect, and spurred on by former World 
Bank President James Wolfensohn, a staunch proponent of 
collaborations among the World Bank, governments, and non-
government donors in the aid effort,63 the World Bank reached out 
to many non-government sources of development aid throughout 
Wolfensohn’s tenure.  The World Bank’s efforts led to the creation 
of numerous new global programs funded by diverse sources, 
working together in partnership with each other and with 
recipients to provide grants.  As a result, the World Bank now 
hosts over seventy separate grant-making global programs, all of 
which operate with their own distinct identities under the 
umbrella of the World Bank, which typically serves as trustee of 
the funds that donors commit to the partnership.64  The partners 
include many foundations and non-governmental organizations.  
The partnerships usually have their own governing bodies, 
comprised of partner representatives and their own secretariat 
(which will frequently be comprised of Bank staff).  They include, 
for example, the Critical Ecosystems Partnership, the Global Water 
Partnership, Popular Coalition to Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, 
Cities Alliance, and the Global Road Safety Partnership.65  They 
                                                     
62 SACHS, supra note 3, at 212–13. 
63 See James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank, Speech to the Cambridge 
Business and Environment Program (Nov. 17, 1998), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/B4SIAP9ZM0 (calling on members of business, 
government, and civil society to cooperate in addressing the myriad challenges 
facing the modern global community). 
64 World Bank Operations Evaluation Department [OED], Addressing the 
Challenges of Globalization: An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank’s Approach to 
Global Programs xxii (2004), available at http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/oed 
/oeddoclib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/ 
762997a38851fa0685256f8200777e15/$FILE/gppp_main_report_phase_2.pdf. 
65 For a more extensive list of such programs, see id. at Annex H. 
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exercise a considerable degree of autonomy in the design and 
purpose of the grants they provide and set their own criteria for 
grant assistance.66 
2.2.4. The Impact of Donors’ Concern About Developing Country 
Debt 
Starting in the late 1980s, concern about unmanageable levels 
of developing country debt translated into a series of actions that 
ultimately increased, to a great degree, the amount of development 
assistance passing through the World Bank to developing countries 
in the form of grants.  The actions began with an initiative to 
provide heavily indebted poor countries with grant finance to be 
used for paying off commercial loans.  That was followed by 
initiatives to cancel some of the debt owed by heavily indebted 
countries to IBRD and IDA.  Those initiatives then evolved into 
gathering momentum in favor of having IDA provide funds in the 
form of grants rather than loans.  The initiatives to cancel debt 
owed to IDA and to provide IDA assistance in the form of grants 
operate on the premises that: (a) debt relief and IDA grants should 
only go to countries that are committed to good governance; (b) 
such commitment should be measured in accordance with agreed 
performance targets; and (c) donors should allocate such assistance 
within a results management framework. 
The first debt relief initiative, the IDA Debt Reduction Facility, 
emerged in 1989, following the announcement of the United States 
Brady Initiative.67  It was set up to provide grants to countries that 
                                                     
66 Id. at xxi–xxii. 
67 World Bank, World Development Report: Poverty, at 8 (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1990), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default 
/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/12/13/000178830_98101903345649 
/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.  The Brady Initiative was launched in March 
1989 and is designed to achieve “case-by-case debt reduction accompanied by 
official financial support that is conditional on domestic policy reform.”  Id.  
Named for its proponent, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, the Brady 
Initiative proposed allocating resources from the World Bank and the IMF to 
promote the reduction of debtor countries’ debt obligations and interest 
payments.  The allocated funds were used to augment the credit-worthiness of 
securities to be exchanged for commercial banks’ already existing loans.  Mexico 
was the first country to enter a debt agreement under the Brady initiative and 
over five hundred banks worldwide negotiated to exchange their Mexican loans 
with enhanced bonds or to lend Mexico new money.  The banks could choose to 
either convert their outstanding debt to bonds with a reduced face value and 
market-based interest rate, or convert their outstanding debt to bonds with the 
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qualified for loans from IDA but not from IBRD (“IDA-only 
countries”) for commercial debt reduction operations.68  It was 
initially funded out of IBRD net income.69  In 1996, the Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund developed a more ambitious 
framework of action, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Debt 
Relief Initiative (HIPC), to address heavily indebted poor 
countries’ external debt burden.  The framework (which was 
amended in 1999 to provide faster and deeper relief) provides a 
basis for creditors to provide debt relief to thirty-seven countries 
identified as heavily indebted poor countries.70 
To be eligible for debt relief under the framework, a country 
has to be an IDA-only country, face an unsustainable debt 
situation, as determined by the Bank, after all traditional debt relief 
mechanisms have been exhausted, and pledge to undertake a 
series of macroeconomic reforms.71  The costs of the initiative to 
multilateral creditors are met in part by support from a trust fund, 
the HIPC Trust Fund, to which donors pledged over $3 billion.72  
The trust fund reimburses IDA and certain regional and sub-
regional multilateral creditors for debt relief provided to HIPC-
eligible countries.73  These efforts to provide debt relief served as 
the precursor of a major shift in IDA from loan assistance to grant 
assistance for heavily indebted countries that subsequently 
occurred in 2005. 
                                                                                                                        
same face value but a reduced and fixed interest rate, or they could provide new 
loans.  Haluk Unal et al., The Brady Plan, 1989 Mexican Debt-Reduction Agreement, 
and Bank Stock Returns in the United States and Japan, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 410, 410–11 (1993). 
68 World Bank, FAQS—Debt Reduction Facility—Questions and Answers 
(Apr. 6, 2007), http://go.worldbank.org/KLJLN9UHR0. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  A “heavily indebted poor country” is defined as a country “struggling 
to cope with heavy debt.”  World Bank, FAQ—Debt Relief, 
http://go.worldbank.org/2YHKG4QYS0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).  Countries 
that fit this definition include Benin, Bolivia, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, 
Madagascar, and Nicaragua, among others.  World Bank, Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries, http://go.worldbank.org/4IMVXTQ090 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
71 Alejandra Viveros, Debt Relief: Debt Strategies for Sustainable Growth and 
Poverty Reduction (Sept. 2008), http://go.worldbank.org/KNZR2IIQG0. 
72 GOBIND NANKANI & TIMOTHY GEITHNER, IMF & WORLD BANK, HEAVILY 
INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HIPC) INITIATIVE—STATISTICAL UPDATE 3 (2003). 
73 Id. 
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2.3. The Rise of the World Bank Grant:  IDA 
2.3.1. Background 
IDA’s switch in emphasis from loan finance to grant finance for 
debt distressed countries evolved gradually over the course of 
several IDA replenishments.  IDA’s Articles of Agreement 
authorize the replenishment of IDA by providing for the periodic 
review of the adequacy of IDA’s resources.74  IDA replenishments 
are negotiated over the course of a series of meetings between 
representatives of donor countries known as IDA Deputies.75  Each 
replenishment has two distinct phases.  First, the IDA Deputies 
negotiate the total amount of the three-year replenishment, 
individual donor country contributions, and overall policy.76  
Second, each member country passes legislation authorizing an 
appropriation for its respective contribution.77 
2.3.2. The Push for IDA to Provide Grant Assistance 
Pressure to make some IDA funding available in the form of 
grants, subject to the recipient country making progress on 
macroeconomic reforms, began in 1996 in the course of the 
                                                     
74 TONY FAINT, SELECTIVITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN IDA’S REPLENISHMENTS 3 
(2003).  See also, IDA, THE IDA DEPUTIES: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 1–2 (2001), 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources 
/Seminar%20PDFs/deputS.pdf (describing the replenishment process and 
providing a history of IDA replenishments). 
75 IDA, supra note 74.  Since the thirteenth replenishment of IDA (“IDA 13”), 
which took place in 2002, representatives of countries receiving IDA assistance 
have been invited to attend IDA replenishment meetings.  They do not, however, 
have a vote.  See IDA, ADDITIONS TO IDA RESOURCES: THIRTEENTH REPLENISHMENT 1 
(2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources 
/IDA13Report.pdf.  Under Article III, Section 1(d) of IDA’s Articles of Agreement, 
IDA replenishments must be approved by a two-thirds majority of IDA’s 
members. 
76 MARTIN WEISS, CONG. RES. SERV., THE WORLD BANK’S INTERNATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION (IDA) 5 (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov 
/documents/organization/84308.pdf. 
77 Id.  In the United States, for example, Congress authorizes the United 
States participation in an IDA replenishment on the basis of the agreement that 
has been forged by the IDA Deputies.  Once that authorization is in place, the U.S. 
President seeks annual appropriations from Congress for the U.S. share of each 
replenishment.  Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
512 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
eleventh IDA replenishment.78  At that time, IDA Deputies agreed 
that some of the resources of the replenishment should be used to 
provide grants, but only in selected cases, exceptional 
circumstances (as determined by the Bank’s Board of Executive 
Directors), and on a limited scale.79  In 1999, in the course of 
negotiating the twelfth IDA replenishment, IDA Deputies 
expanded the availability of grant financing from IDA by 
providing that IDA resources could be used to provide grants in 
furtherance of the HIPC program or to assist post-conflict countries 
prior to arrears clearance as a last resort.80 
2.3.2.1. The Meltzer Commission Recommendations 
The push for IDA to provide grant assistance received a further 
boost upon publication of the report of the International Financial 
Institutions Advisory Commission, chaired by Carnegie Mellon 
University Professor, Alan Meltzer (“the Meltzer Commission”) in 
2001.  The Meltzer Commission was set up by Congressional 
Republicans in 1998 in response to legislation enacted that same 
year authorizing the United States to participate in deliberations on 
an IMF quota increase.81  Among other suggestions, the report 
proposed a radical change in both Ithe World Bank and IDA’s 
operations, recommending that both the World Bank and IDA 
discontinue issuing loans, absent certain circumstances, and 
instead issue what it described as “special purpose grants.”82 
The report recommended that the World Bank and IDA replace 
their loan programs with grant programs geared specifically 
towards alleviating poverty and promoting structural reform and 
focused on areas such as health care, primary education, and 
physical infrastructure.  Further, it suggested that the World Bank 
be terminated and replaced with a new grant program funded 
entirely through a trust fund capitalized by the World Bank’s paid-
in capital.83  The report also specified the manner in which IDA 
                                                     
78 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION, IDA ELIGIBILITY, TERMS AND 




81 Raymond F. Mikesell, Review Article: Meltzer Commission Report on 
International Institutions, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 883, 883 (2001). 
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and the newly constituted World Bank should make grants, 
stressing that the availability of grant assistance should be tied to 
the recipient’s achievement of specific performance goals.84  In 
addition, it recommended that the grants be funneled through 
private suppliers of goods and services that would be compensated 
upon verification by independent auditors that the quantitative 
goals agreed upon in advance had been achieved.85 
2.3.2.2. An Increased Set Aside for Grants 
The international community did not embrace the sweeping 
changes advocated by the Meltzer Commission, but the United 
States adopted many of the Commission’s ideas as part of its 
agenda for the IDA.86  In the negotiations leading up to the 
thirteenth replenishment of IDA (“IDA 13”), the United States 
pushed for policy changes in IDA that flowed directly from the 
philosophy of the Meltzer Commission.  First, it urged that the 
Bank’s system of allocating IDA funds amongst countries eligible 
to receive IDA assistance should be changed.  Prior to IDA 13, the 
amount of IDA funds allocated to a country for each three-year 
replenishment period depended on a formula which took into 
account both the country’s commitment to, and progress on, 
reforming its policy and institutional framework (i.e. the quality of 
a country’s governance) and the country’s level of poverty.87  The 
United States wanted IDA to change the formula so as to accord 
much greater weight to a country’s governance than to its level of 
poverty.88  Second, the United States urged that IDA substantially 
                                                     
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Santosh Anagol, Reforming the International Development Association: 
Are Grants the Solution? (May 20, 2002) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Stanford 
University) available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/Honors 
_Theses/Theses_2002/Anagol.pdf. 
87 The allocation process set a norm, not a hard and fast entitlement to receive 
IDA funding.  IDA, ALLOCATING IDA FUNDS BASED ON PERFORMANCE: FOURTH 
ANNUAL REPORT ON IDA’S COUNTRY ASSESSMENT AND ALLOCATION PROCESS 1-2 
(2003), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/PBAAR4.pdf 
[hereinafter FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT].  It established an envelope of resources that 
each country eligible for IDA assistance could expect to receive.  Id. at 2. 
88 IDA, IDA’S PERFORMANCE-BASED ALLOCATION SYSTEM: CURRENT AND 
EMERGING ISSUES 1, 3–4 (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org 
/IDA/Resources/MTRPBA.pdf. 
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increase the percentage of its resources used to make grants.89  The 
United States indicated that it would increase its contribution to 
IDA if these changes were adopted.90 
In the thirteenth replenishment of IDA, the IDA Deputies 
adopted these policy changes.91  With respect to IDA providing 
grants, IDA Deputies decided that eighteen to twenty-one percent 
of IDA financing provided during the thirteenth replenishment 
period should be in the form of grants.92  They limited IDA grants, 
however, to programs or projects in five designated categories: (i) 
HIV/AIDs relief; (ii) reconstruction necessitated by natural 
disasters; (iii) “poorest countries” relief; (iv) “poorest and debt-
vulnerable countries” relief; and (v) “post-conflict countries” 
relief.93  Although grant assistance was not limited to specific 
sectors, investments improving education, health, and the 
provision of clean water and sanitation were to receive special 
attention.94 
2.3.2.3. The Gleneagles Commitment:  Grants Not Loans for 
Debt-Burdened Countries 
IDA’s thirteenth replenishment opened the door for IDA to 
provide a significant amount of its funds in the form of grants.  The 
fourteenth replenishment (“IDA 14”) opened that door wider. 95  
                                                     
89 JODY ZALL KUSEK & RAY C. RIST, A HANDBOOK FOR DEVELOPMENT 
PRACTITIONERS: TEN STEPS TO A RESULTS-BASED MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
SYSTEM 7 (2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/27/35281194.pdf. 
90 Id.  The Thirteenth Replenishment also introduced a results measurement 
framework for the IDA, designed to inform discussions about IDA’s effectiveness 
and to measure IDA countries’ aggregate progress towards the Millennium 
Development Goals.  Id. 
91 EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS OF IDA, ADDITIONS TO IDA RESOURCES: THIRTEENTH 
REPLENISHMENT 42–43 (2002), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA 
/Resources/IDA13Report.pdf [hereinafter IDA 13 ADDITIONS]. 
92 Jonathan E. Sanford, IDA Grants and HIPC Debt Cancellation: Their 
Effectiveness and Impact on IDA Resources, 32 WORLD DEV. 1579, 1588 (2004). 
93 IDA, IDA GRANTS—IMPLEMENTATION IN FY03 1-3 (2003), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/MTRgrantsFY03.pdf 
[hereinafter GRANT IMPLEMENTATION IDA 13].  “Poorest Countries” signified IDA-
only countries having a GNP per capita equal or less than $360.  “Poorest and 
Debt-Vulnerable Countries” meant IDA-only countries with demonstrated debt 
vulnerability and having a GNP/capita equal to or less than $360.  Id. at 3. 
94 IDA 13 ADDITIONS, supra note 91, at 13. 
95 See generally IDA, Assessing Implementation of the IDA14 Grants Framework, at 
1 (2006), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default 
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Following the commitment made by the G-8 heads of state at their 
July 2005 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland to address the problem of 
developing country debt,96  IDA abandoned the IDA 13’s approach 
of limiting grant finance to eighteen to twenty percent of IDA’s 
resources and to certain categories of programs.  Instead, IDA 
Deputies created a system whereby countries which qualify for 
IDA funding but are debt distressed receive grant assistance 
provided that they exhibit good governance, defined as adopting 
economic plans, determined by IDA to be sound.97  IDA donor 
countries pledged the largest expansion of IDA resources in two 
decades to fund this new approach.98 
Under the IDA 14 system, the amount of grant assistance a 
country receives from IDA in the form of grants depends on the 
country’s debt status.  IDA determines the debt risk of recipient 
countries in accordance with a scale that ranges from low risk of 
debt distress to moderate and high risk, with the final rating being 
                                                                                                                        
/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006/10/31/000011823_20061031140856 
/Rendered/PDF/37870.pdf (describing IDA 14’s new loosened eligibility 
requirement for countries to receive grants from IDA—that is to demonstrate a 
risk of debt distress). 
96 Communiqué of Gleneagles G8 Summit: Africa, Gleneagles, Scot., July 6–8, 
2005, Climate Change, Energy and Sustainable Development, paras. 29–30, available at 
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2005gleneagles/communique.pdf.  The G8 
representatives at Gleneagles also decided that a substantial amount of 
outstanding debt to IDA should be cancelled.  See id. at para. 29 (stating that the 
G8 agreed to a proposal to cancel all outstanding debts).  This decision was 
implemented in March 2006, when the World Bank established the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative, which provides heavily indebted poor countries with 100 
percent cancellation of debts owed to IDA and other international financial 
institutions.  See World Bank, IDA’s Implementation of the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, at 1–2 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources 
/MDRIfinalimplementation.pdf (discussing the key features of the Multilateral 
Debt Relief Initiative).   As of March 2008, some twenty-three countries had 
qualified for this form of relief.  IMF, The Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative 
Factsheet, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/mdri.htm (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008). 
97 See IDA, IDA Results Measurement System: Recommendations for IDA14, at 1 
(2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources 
/IDA14resultsrecommendations.pdf [hereinafter IDA 14 Results Measurement] 
(stating that the IDA Results Measurement System’s “performance-based 
allocation system provides incentives to countries to improve policies and 
strengthen institutions in pursuit of longer-term results”). 
98 IDA, Additions To IDA Resources: Financing The Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative, at 13 (2006), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT 
/Resources/35768_2.pdf. 
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“in distress.”99  A country’s grant/loan ratio is determined 
according to its debt rating, with countries identified as being “in 
debt distress” receiving 100 percent of the IDA funds allocated to 
them in the form of grants. 100 
The IDA 14 system greatly expands the availability of grant 
finance.  The threshold qualification for obtaining IDA assistance 
(whether in the form of loans or grants) remains commitment to, 
and progress in, setting in place good governance.  Once that 
threshold is met, however, a country can qualify to receive a 
substantial amount of the funds allocated to it by IDA in the form 
of grants.  This approach to grant finance has continued in the 
fifteenth replenishment of IDA, for which negotiations were 
completed in December 2007.101  At that time, donor countries to 
IDA pledged a record $25.1 billion, the largest expansion of donor 
funding in IDA’s history.102 
In sum, the emergence of the World Bank grant as a core 
instrument of overseas development aid resulted from a 
combination of factors which, taken together, have led to new 
norms and changed the face of overseas development aid.  They 
include a proliferation of trust funds formed to address special 
purposes, an increasing prevalence of public-private partnerships 
for development, a recognition of the importance of incorporating 
the views of aid recipients and civil society in the design and 
                                                     
99 See IDA 14 Results Measurement, supra note 97, at 2–3.  IDA rates countries’ 
level of debt in accordance with an analytical tool developed jointly by the IMF 
and the World Bank, known as the Debt Sustainability Framework (“DSF”).  Id. at 
1.  The DSF analyzes external and public sector debt to determine a country’s 
projected debt burden over a twenty-year period and its vulnerability to external 
and policy shocks.  See IMF & World Bank, Debt Sustainability in Low-Income 
Countries: Further Considerations on an Operational Framework and Policy Implications, 
at 19 (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDEBTDEPT/PolicyPapers 
/20279458/DSfullpapersept.pdf (discussing further operational considerations for 
the proposed debt sustainability). 
100 IDA, Debt Sustainability & Grants, http://go.worldbank.org 
/16FWL21Y51 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); IDA, How IDA Resources are Allocated 
(June 2008), http://go.worldbank.org/F5531ZQHT0 (describing IDA’s method of 
evaluating a country’s efforts to implement satisfactory economic policies in order 
for IDA to determine the amount of funds that should be allocated to the country 
in need). 
101 World Bank, IDA15 Replenishment, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE 
/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:21234677~menuPK:3492269 
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delivery of aid and a more realistic approach to the ability of 
certain developing countries to absorb further debt.  As Section 3 
shows, the range and scale of activities that World Bank grants 
address touch upon every aspect of development. 
3.  THE WORLD BANK GRANT AS A CORE INSTRUMENT OF OVERSEAS 
DEVELOPMENT AID 
The breadth, range, and scale of grants channeled through the 
World Bank underscores the vital role that World Bank grants now 
play in the broader aid agenda.  The primary sources of this grant 
assistance are trust funds and IDA funds directed at debt 
distressed countries.  Grants from trust funds break down into 
several categories; (i) grants to safeguard global public goods; (ii) 
grants to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and advance 
other global programs; (iii) grants for crisis relief, humanitarian 
needs, and post-conflict assistance; (iv) grants for debt relief; and 
(v) grants to pilot innovative financing initiatives.  Grants from 
IDA, on the other hand, span the full range of IDA’s development 
objectives. 
In addition, a further source of finance for World Bank grants, 
which consists of set asides from the World Bank’s net income, 
directed at funding some World Bank grant programs primarily 
designed to provide seed money for initiatives that would not 
qualify for a loan.  Examination of the nature of the grants that 
make up this expansive World Bank grant universe reveals a span 
of activities involving many stakeholders and different kinds of 
actors that calls for a nuanced, flexible, and sophisticated legal 
framework. 
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3.1. Grants from Trust Funds 
3.1.1. Grants to Safeguard Global Public Goods103 
3.1.1.1.  GEF Trust Fund Grants 
The World Bank serves as both trustee and implementing 
agency of the GEF Fund.  As trustee, it transfers trust fund 
resources to certain entities the donors have approved to serve as 
implementing and executing agencies for the Fund.  These include 
a number of U.N. affiliated programs and agencies and the four 
regional development banks: the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the African 
Development Bank, and the InterAmerican Development Bank.104  
These intermediaries pass on GEF funds to developing counties in 
the form of grants, which can be made to both government and 
non-government entities. 
GEF grants vary significantly in scale and are divided into four 
categories: full-sized grants (over $1 million); medium-sized 
(between $1 million and $500,000); grants for enabling activities, 
i.e. activities which finance the preparation of a plan or strategy to 
fulfill a country’s commitments under a global environment 
convention (which can range from $100,00 to over $1 million); and 
project preparation grants (reimbursements of the actual costs of 
preparing project proposals).105  Recent grant proposals under 
discussion, for example, include projects to develop renewable 
energy technologies in the Marshall Islands, to phase out methyl 
bromide in Ukraine, and to develop a basin management 
framework for the Tisza Tran boundary River Basin. 
Non-government organizations have a keen interest in GEF 
grants as they frequently play a key role in implementing them.  
The GEF Secretariat consults semi-annually with non-
                                                     
103 The term “global public good” is drawn from economics which 
differentiates between private goods and public goods.  Inge Kaul et al., Why Do 
Public Goods Matter Today?, in PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING 
GLOBALIZATION 3, 3 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003).  The benefits of private goods are 
rival in consumption and excludable. In contrast, those of public goods are non-
rival and non-excludable.  Id.  Thus, public goods are in the public domain, there 
for all to consume.  Depending on the reach of their benefits, they are categorized 
as local, national, regional, or global.  Id. 
104 Freestone, supra note 4, at 1078–79, 1106 n.127. 
105 The World Bank, GEF Grants, http://go.worldbank.org/ZTPX1HP1D0 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
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governmental organizations and civil society representatives also 
regularly attend meetings of the GEF Council as observers.106 
3.1.1.2. Global Fund Grants 
Grants from the Global Fund cover a wide range of activities, 
including preventing the spread of diseases, treating people who 
are ill, and providing care and support for affected people and 
communities by scaling up existing effective interventions or 
piloting new and innovative responses.107  Grant activities may also 
include efforts to improve the availability of health services, 
strengthen health systems and human resource capacity, promote 
behavior change, provide critical health products (such as 
antiretroviral therapy, drugs for tuberculosis, and anti-malarial 
drugs), or conduct operational research.108  Examples of activities 
that have been funded worldwide by the Global Fund include 
providing antiretroviral treatments for HIV, tuberculosis treatment 
under directly-observed treatment, short-course (“DOTS”), and 
distributing insecticide-treated bed nets to protect families from 
malaria.109 
Eligible grant recipients include government ministries, 
nongovernmental and faith-based organizations, private sector 
firms, and foundations.110  They are expected to be local 
stakeholders rather than United Nations agencies or other 
                                                     
106 First GEF Council Meeting, Washington, D.C., July 12–13, 1994, Joint 
Summary of the Chairs, 3–4, available at http://www.gefweb.org/Documents 
/Council_Documents/Joint_Summary_-_July_1994_English.pdf. 
107 Anne Triponel, Global Fund To Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria: A New 
Legal And Conceptual Framework for Providing International Development Aid, in 
MULTILATERAL CONCESSIONAL FINANCING: ORGANIZATION, DECISION-MAKING, 
MODALITIES (forthcoming 2009). 
108 Id. (citing Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round 7, at 31 (2007), 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/apply/call/seven/Guidelines_for 
_Proposals_R7_en.pdf [hereinafter, Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round 
7]). 
109 See generally Global Fund, Partners in Impact: Results Report 6 (2007), 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/files/about/replenishment/oslo 
/Progress%20Report.pdf (presenting the Global Fund model for providing 
services geared to combating the three pandemic diseases); Global Fund, How the 
Global Fund Works, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/how/ (last visited Dec. 
1, 2008) (describing the principles and programs of the Global Fund). 
110 See Global Fund, Guidelines for Proposals Round 7, supra note 108, at 35. 
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multilateral or bilateral development agencies.111  Direct recipients 
of Global Fund grants will frequently disburse the grant proceeds 
to sub-recipients who implement the grant activities.  The direct 
recipient, however, is the entity that is accountable to the Fund for 
the use of the grant proceeds.112  Grant proposals are initiated at 
the country level, whereby, in a manner unique to the Global Fund, 
representatives from the government and non-government 
sector—with expertise on many levels in the treatment and care for 
HIV, AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis—agree together on a 
coordinated country proposal to be submitted to the Global 
Fund.113 
3.1.1.3. Avian and Human Influenza Facility Grants 
Unlike the Global Fund, the Avian and Human Influenza 
Facility channels its grant financing primarily to governments.  A 
typical grant from the Avian and Human Influenza Facility is the 
$2.9 million grant recently made to Uzbekistan for activities 
designed to enhance its capacity to prevent the spread of avian 
flu.114 
3.1.2.  Grants to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals and 
Other Global Program Objectives 
From the beginning, it was understood that the developing 
world would need grants from the developed world in order to 
achieve the MDGs.  Indeed, adoption of the goals as a priority 
platform for overseas development aid was premised on the 
understanding that developed country governments would 
                                                     
111 See Global Fund, Fiduciary Arrangements for Grant Recipients, at 3–4 (2003) 
(stating the duties and obligations of grant recipients). 
112 Id. at 4. 
113 These representatives work together as a group, termed, in the constituent 
documents of the Global Fund, a “Country Coordinating Mechanism.”  See 
Triponel, supra note 107, at n.134 (noting that the Global Fund is flexible in terms 
of which entities function as in-country structures); see also Global Fund, Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms, http://www.theglobalfund.org/EN/mechanisms/ 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (stating that the purpose of Country Coordinating 
Mechanisms is to enable countries to participate in the decision making process of 
creating grant proposals to be submitted to the Global Fund and implementing 
them upon approval). 
114 Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Supports Avian Influenza Control 
and Human Preparedness and Response Project in Uzbekistan (May 3, 2007), 
available at http://go.worldbank.org/4EODSHVO40. 
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increase their development assistance.115  Although the resources 
that have been forthcoming to further the goals have fallen short of 
what is needed,116 the goals have served as a galvanizing force to 
target grant funds to the eight goal areas.  The Education For All 
Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, set up by several donor 
countries in 2003 to provide grants to developing countries to 
support primary school education, further to the achievement of 
MDG Two (universal primary school education by 2015), is an 
example of such an initiative.117 
The seventy global programs set up by multiple public and 
private partnerships and housed and administered by the World 
Bank make grants in widely varying amounts to a wide range of 
recipients for a wide range of purposes.  Examples include a grant 
of $500,000 to Mozambique from Cities Alliance (a global program 
set up by several donors to provide grants to cities to address 
slums and other city-specific needs) for the improvement of water 
and sanitation in Quelimane City and a grant of $220,000 to 
Fondation Zakoura in Morocco from the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (“C-GAP”) (a program set up by multiple donors to 
fund research on microfinance).118 
3.1.3.  Grants for Crisis Relief, Humanitarian Needs, and Post-
Conflict Assistance 
Grant funds are, necessarily, the funding vehicle of choice to 
respond to crises brought about by natural phenomena, such as a 
tsunami or earthquake.  They are also the only feasible form of 
                                                     
115 See Michael A. Clemens et al., The Millennium Development Goals, Aid 
Targets, and the Costs of Over-Expectations, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 58, 58–59 
(2005) (discussing the causal chain between increasing aid and reaching the 
MDGs, and assessing the likelihood of attaining these goals). 
116 See SACHS, supra note 3, at 270 (commenting on the “chronically 
underfunded” nature of the programs of the MDGs). 
117 See Sophie Smyth & Anna Triponel, Education as a Lynchpin of Development: 
Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of the Education For All—Fast Track 
Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 8, 8–9 (2005) 
(discussing the idea behind the Education For All Fast Track Initiative and its 
objectives). 
118 Cities Alliance: Cities Without Slums, List of Cities Alliance Financed 
Activities (Dec. 31, 2006), http://www.citiesalliance.org/activities-output 
/activities-financed.html; World Bank, GAP Grant to Fondation Zakoura, 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64283627&piPK 
=73230&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=P077491 (last visited Dec. 
1, 2008). 
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assistance for a country that is war-torn or struggling to cope with 
civil war and political strife.  Accordingly, donors of development 
aid have established a range of funds to provide grant assistance in 
the wake of natural disasters, such as the Multi-Donor Fund for 
Aceh and Nias—a $704 million fund set up to provide grant 
assistance to Indonesia following the 2005 tsunami.119  They have 
also set up funds dedicated to providing grants to countries in 
post-conflict situations.120  In recent years funds set up to provide 
grant assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan have swollen the grant 
resources available in this category.121  Non-governmental 
organizations play an active role in implementing these kinds of 
grants.122 
Grants in these categories are very varied.  The Aceh and Nias 
Fund has focused on grants to rebuild housing and other physical 
assets and infrastructure and creation of a government-led 
Economic Development Financing Facility to foster job creation.123  
The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund recently made a grant 
of several million dollars to the government of Afghanistan’s 
National Solidarity Program for water, road, and other small 
infrastructure projects.124  The projects were designed with input 
from a network of non-government organizations and rural 
community representatives.125  On a smaller scale, the Post-Conflict 
                                                     
119 Multi Donor Trust Fund for Aceh and Nias—Bersama Membangun, 
http://www.multidonorfund.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
120 See World Bank, Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program: Overview & 
Challenges, http://go.worldbank.org/FE0JQLDI10 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) 
(furnishing an overview of the National Solidarity Program’s approach and 
achievements in war-torn Afghanistan). 
121 TRUST FUNDS BOARD REPORT, supra note 23, at 7. 
122 See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental 
Organizations, 25 CORNELL INT’L. L. J. 623 (1992) (discussing interaction and legal 
aspects of collaboration between World Bank and NGOs). 
123 Press Release, Multi Donor Fund, The Multi Donor Fund Reports on 
Impact and Support for Transition (Dec. 18, 2007), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/R4LM3EJW30. 
124 See World Bank, Strengthening Local Governance and Promoting 
Community Based Development in Afghanistan, http://go.worldbank.org 
/XS6ZPWKT90 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting the development of local 
governance in Afghanistan); World Bank, Afghanistan: Schools, Roads, and 
Drinking Water for Villages, http://go.worldbank.org/T9531FFHW0 (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008) (discussing the priorities of the Afghani people upon return home 
after living as refugees). 
125  World Bank, Strengthening Local Governance and Promoting 
Community Based Development in Afghanistan, supra note 124. 
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Fund recently made a grant of $50,000 to the Iraqi Widow’s 
Organization for a project aimed to boost widows’ incomes by 
providing them with small loans to start their own businesses.126 
3.1.4. Grants for Debt Relief 
In addition to the extensive debt relief initiatives funded by 
HIPC and, subsequently, by the Multilateral Debt Initiative, grants 
have been used to give debt relief assistance.  IDA Debt Reduction 
Facility grants have been used to finance legal and financial 
advisors to help countries prepare commercial debt reduction 
operations and to finance the cost of their implementation.  Most of 
these operations have been cash buybacks at significant discounts.  
Such operations have been carried out in many countries, 
including Albania, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Guyana, and 
Senegal, among others.127 
3.1.5. Grants for Innovative Financing Initiatives 
Grants have become a favored modality for launching 
experimental and innovative initiatives.  Trust funds that provide 
grants for output-based aid approaches and for covering the costs 
of catastrophe insurance for crops being grown in the developing 
world, for example, provide a vehicle for such approaches to be 
piloted.  Typical grants in this category include grants from the 
Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid (“GPOBA”) and the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (“CCRIF”).128 
The GPOBA funds output-based aid methods to promote 
increased access to infrastructure and social services for the poor in 
developing countries.  GPOBA’s focus sectors are water, sanitation, 
electricity, health, telecommunications, transportation, and 
education.  As of June 2008, the GPOBA has provided over $150 
million to fund sixty-seven projects. 
                                                     
126 Press Release, World Bank, Post-Conflict Grant to Boost Iraqi Widows’ 
Incomes Through Microcredit (May 15, 2004), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/4TR73267Z0. 
127 World Bank, Global Development Finance: Striving for Stability in 
Development Finance, at 70–79 (2003), available at http://siteresources.worldbank 
.org/INTRGDF/Resources/GDF_vol_1_web.pdf. 
128 See Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid, About GPOBA, 
http://www.gpoba.org/gpoba/index.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing 
the nature of this trust fund and the grants it offers); see also sources cited infra 
note 131 (describing formation of a new trust fund to assist Caribbean nations). 
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The CCRIF is a trust fund established in February 2007 from 
grants made by Japan, France, Canada, Bermuda, the United 
Kingdom, the Caribbean Development Bank, IBRD, and IDA 
totaling almost $50 million.  The CCRIF is a trust fund that 
provides Caribbean community (“CARICOM”) member or 
associate- member countries with immediate liquidity if hit by a 
natural disaster such as a hurricane or earthquake.129  The CCRIF is 
a pooled facility that allows Caribbean countries to buy insurance 
coverage for natural disaster risks at a significantly reduced cost.130  
The CCRIF provides member countries with immediate payment 
using a parametric system of claims and determinations.  Eighteen 
Caribbean governments participate in the CCRIF and each 
participating country determines the level of coverage it 
purchases.131 
3.2. Grants from the IDA 
IDA grants cover the full spectrum of IDA’s operations, 
including basic social services, clean water and sanitation, 
infrastructure, and institutional reforms.  They can be for many 
millions of dollars.  Typical IDA projects include a rural 
electrification project in Bangladesh, for which IDA provided $191 
million, a rural water supply and sanitation project in Yemen, for 
which IDA provided $165 million, and a road sector development 
project in Ethiopia, for which IDA provided $306.5 million.132  
                                                     
129 World Bank, The Acting Corporate Secretary: Proposed Trust Fund for the 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, ¶¶ 1, 3–4 n.5, Doc. 38927 (Mar. 6, 2007) 
[hereinafter CCRIF Memo], available at http://go.worldbank.org/OIWBB9CEB1 
(internal World Bank document on file with author); Press Release, World Bank, 
First Ever Regional Catastrophe Risk Insurance Pool for the Caribbean Receives 
US $47 Million From Donors (Feb. 26, 2007) [hereinafter CCRIF Press Release], 
available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ 
NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21234428~menuPK:34463~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~the
SitePK:4607,00.html. 
130 CCRIF Memo, supra note 129, ¶ 3. 
131 CCRIF Press Release, supra note 129. 
132 See World Bank, Electricity for Rural Population in Bangladesh (June 
2007), http://go.worldbank.org/HJCNIRQ9G0 (detailing the IDA contribution to 
an electricity project for rural populations in Bangladesh); IDA, Reaching Out to 
Yemen’s Poorest, Most Remote Communities (Mar. 2007), http://go.worldbank 
.org/EPN0AR8GY0 (describing the IDA contribution to a project which channeled 
resources to remote populations in Yemen); IDA, Improved Roads in Ethiopia 
Stimulate Integration of Markets (Mar. 2007), http://go.worldbank.org 
/IIXE4PKC60 (describing the IDA contribution to the project for improved roads 
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Grants can be made to a variety of entities such as governments, 
political subdivisions of governments, public or private entities in 
member territories, and public international or regional 
organizations.133 
3.3. Grants from the World Bank’s Net Income 
Further to the quest for effective innovative approaches to 
development aid, the World Bank funds two grant programs out of 
its own net income that provide seed money to new initiatives.  
These are the Development Marketplace (which is also supported 
by some trust funds and other sources) and the Development 
Grant Facility.  The Bank also provides some grant funding for 
small-scale initiatives through its Small Grants Program and to 
governments for law reform and institution-building through the 
Institutional Development Fund. 
The Development Marketplace (“DM”) is a competitive grant 
program administered by the Bank and supported by various 
partners which aims to fund innovative, early-stage projects with 
potential for development impact.134  DM competitions, which are 
open to individuals and organizations, are held at the global, 
regional, and country level.  Each competition has a development 
focus, such as health and nutrition, water supply and sanitation, 
and livelihoods in a sustainable environment.  Since its inception, 
the DM has provided more than $46 million in grants to support 
over one thousand projects worldwide.135  Supported projects 
                                                                                                                        
in Ethiopia).  Subject to the need to allocate IDA resources equitably amongst 
qualifying countries, much of IDA’s support for such projects will now be made 
available through grants rather than credits.  IDA, Debt Sustainability & Grants, 
http://go.worldbank.org/16FWL21Y51 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing the 
eligibility for grants). 
133 See IDA Articles of Agreement of the International Development 
Association art. V, § 2(c), Aug. 9, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249 
[hereinafter IDA Articles of Agreement] (stating the form and terms of financing 
of the IDA). 
134 Partners include the Gates Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, 
multilateral agencies, and various other entities such as embassies, local 
government organizations, research centers, and large corporations. Grants range 
from $50,000 to $200,000 with the average grant being $180,000.  Global 
Development Marketplace, DM2008 Competition Guidelines, 
http://go.worldbank.org/EZLKFQGK40 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
135 See World Bank, Development Marketplace—Projects, 
http://go.worldbank.org/0G0PN590D0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) (describing the 
selection criteria for DM projects); World Bank, Development Marketplace: 
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include one providing plastic buckets with ultraviolet lighting to 
purify water in Mexico, another building eco-friendly homes for 
the poor in Kyrgyzstan, and a third providing low-cost reading 
glasses to the poor in India.136   
Established in 1998, the Development Grant Facility (“DGF”) 
supports global programs and partnerships that the Bank deems to 
be of high value to the Bank’s borrowing member countries but 
that are not readily amenable to being funded through regular 
Bank loans.  The DGF gives grants based on three objectives: (1) 
encouraging innovation through seed money and cutting-edge 
approaches; (2) catalyzing partnerships through convening and 
building coalitions and raising funds; and (3) expanding Bank 
services by increasing the effectiveness of country programs.  The 
Bank allocates approximately $170 million annually of its own 
resources to the DGF. 
Examples of programs that have received DGF support include 
a Roma Education Fund, the Global Road Safety Facility, and the 
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.  Examples of 
grants provided by the Institutional Development Facility and the 
Small Grants Program include a $300,000 grant to Uruguay for the 
“Institutional Justice Strengthening for Equitable Development 
Project” aimed at creating a consensus to implement key actions to 
improve domestic abuse victims’ access to justice, and a $35,000 
grant from the Small Grants Program to the Sri Lankan Youth 
Parliament and five other Sri Lankan organizations to support 
activities for creating knowledge-sharing networks. 
4. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING WORLD BANK GRANTS 
As the preceding Sections of this Article show, changing norms 
in overseas development aid throughout the 1990s and early 2000s 
have resulted in the World Bank grant becoming a core instrument 
of development aid.  Moreover, the increased use of the World 
Bank grant reflects significant changes in what overseas 
                                                                                                                        
Turning Ideas into Action, http://go.worldbank.org/TPSFTH9420 (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008); World Bank, DM2007 Competition Guidelines, 
http://go.worldbank.org/DEBXLIYYS0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
136 See generally, World Bank, UV Buckets Bring Clear Water to Poor Families 
in Mexico, hyyp://go.worldbank.org/A3SSOWSNL0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); 
World Bank, DM Project Builds Eco-Friendly House for Poor in Kyrgystan, 
http://go.worldbank.org/JNFGFGET0 (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); World Bank, 
Reading Glasses for the Poor in India, http://go.worldbank.org/YFY0W2AD50 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
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development aid involves.  Prior to the early 1990s, development 
aid routed through the World Bank was primarily a government-
to-government affair.  The donors and recipients were 
governments; aid involved large-value transfers and was primarily 
in the form of loans.  Today, aid directly involves many 
stakeholders.  Governments, foundations, and non-government 
organizations may all be donors of aid.  And, along with 
governments, there are many non-government recipients. 
Additionally, aid is no longer limited to large-value transfers.  
The fragmentation of aid into issue-specific programs, and the 
wider net of aid recipients, means that transfers of aid can range 
from transfers of several million dollars to transfers as small as a 
few thousand dollars.  A further consequence of increased grant 
aid is that it brings with it a renewed emphasis on performance 
targets and an effort to increase scrutiny of effectiveness.  In 
contrast to loans, where payment tranches may be made 
conditional on earlier loan re-payments having been made, grants 
payable in tranches will likely be conditioned on a showing of 
progress and results.  This can place a recipient in a vulnerable 
position, especially given that the driving forces to make a loan 
(the prospect of earning interest) do not apply to a grantor who 
does not have the equivalent incentive to release grant funds.  
These changing norms call for a review of how well the legal 
framework governing such grants has, or should be, adapted. 
4.1. The Legal Status of a World Bank Grant 
The question of what law governs World Bank grants is 
unsettled but some guidance on what law could or should govern 
can be gleaned from the attention that has been given to the 
question of what law governs World Bank loan agreements.  World 
Bank loan agreements do not contain a typical governing law 
clause.137  Instead they provide that the rights and obligations of 
the parties “shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their 
terms notwithstanding the law of any State or political subdivision 
thereof to the contrary.”138 
The traditional view, as espoused by the World Bank, is 
that World Bank loan agreements with governments are governed 
                                                     
137 See generally John W. Head, Evolution of the Law Governing World Bank Loan 
Agreements, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 214 (1996) (examining the governing law for loan 
agreements entered into by the World Bank). 
138 Id. at 220. 
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by international law and that World Bank loan agreements with 
state-owned entities139 are not governed by international law, 
whilst being exempt from the operation of municipal law.140  This 
view leaves World Bank loan agreements with non-state entities in 
a “legal no man’s land.”141  It has been proposed that both kinds of 
loan agreement should specify public international law as the 
governing law and, in doing so, enumerate the sources of public 
international law to be applied, along the lines of those 
enumerated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice.142   
Analyzing the legal status of World Bank grant agreements in 
the context of this dialogue, such agreements too, under current 
practice, fall into a “legal no man’s land” except when the recipient 
is a government.143  Currently, World Bank grant agreements do 
not contain a governing law clause.144  This Article ascribes to the 
position, however, that all World Bank grant agreements, 
regardless of the nature of the recipient, should provide that they 
are governed by public international law.  Further, this Article 
maintains that World Bank grant agreements should specify that, 
for such purposes, the sources of public international law will be 
those set out in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
                                                     
139 Both IBRD and IDA may make loans to member states, state-owned 
enterprises or private entities.  If a loan is made directly to a state-owned 
enterprise or a private entity, IBRD is required (and IDA is permitted) to have the 
loan guaranteed by the government of the member state in which the project is 
being carried out.  See Articles of Agreement of The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development art. III, §4(i), July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1440, 2 
U.N.T.S. 134, amended Dec. 16, 1995, 16 U.S.T. 1942, 606 U.N.T.S. 294; IDA Articles 
of Agreement, supra note 133, art. V, §2(d).  IDA loans have traditionally been 
made only to member states.  See Head, supra note 137, at 216 n.12. 
140 Head, supra note 137, at 220. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 227-28 n.121  (noting that the fourth clause of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice lists judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists 
as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”). 
143 The theory underlying the World Bank’s view that World Bank loans to 
member states are governed by public international law is that the World Bank, 
both as an international organization and a member state is a subject of 
international law.  See Head, supra note 137 (citing ARON BROCHES, SELECTED 
ESSAYS–WORLD BANK, ICSID AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221 (1995)).  On this view, World Bank grant agreements with 
member states would be governed by international law. 
144 Standard Conditions for Grants Made by the World Bank Out of Various 
Funds (July 2006) [hereinafter World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions or 
Standard Conditions] (on file with author). 
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Court of Justice, which provides that the Court is to apply treaties, 
custom and general principles in deciding disputes submitted to 
it.145 
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the legal status of World 
Bank grant agreements, millions of dollars pass annually from the 
World Bank to the developing world pursuant to these 
agreements.  Many of these agreements implement significant 
policy decisions and all of them respond to the intentions and 
needs of the many different stakeholders involved.  These include 
the donors (which, in the case of donor governments, mean the 
developed world’s tax payers), the recipients (who may be 
governments or non-government entities but who are intended to 
serve as conduits for the ultimate beneficiaries of a grant; the poor 
in the developing country which the grant is intended to help), and 
the World Bank (whose credibility as an institution is tied to the 
effectiveness with which it manages, disburses, and monitors the 
grant funds).  For these reasons, it is important that the terms and 
conditions of these agreements reflect and respond to the needs 
and interests of the stakeholders they affect.  This makes it crucial 
for such agreements to provide for a dispute resolution mechanism 
that facilitates dialogue, review, and resolution when something 
goes, or appears to have gone wrong.  Therefore this Article 
evaluates the World Bank grant agreements according to the extent 
to which they respond to this need. 
4.2. The Terms and Conditions of World Bank Grant Agreements 
4.2.1. The “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom” Approach 
Examination of the legal framework for grant arrangements 
between the World Bank and the recipients of grant aid reveals 
that it has been slow to evolve and has trailed far behind the rapid 
                                                     
145 Detailed reasons for supporting public international law as the governing 
law for World Bank grants are beyond the scope of this Article.  To the extent that 
general principles are relied upon, it must be observed that the legal status of 
grants in the national jurisdictions of many major donor countries is unclear.  See 
generally Fernanda Nicola, Book Review, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 597 (2003) (reviewing 
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (James Gordley ed., 
2001)).  For a view of a system which relies on treaties, see Luke Eric Peterson & Nick 
Gallus, International Investment Treaty Protection of Not-for-Profit Organizations, 10 
INTL. J. OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 47 (2007) (suggesting that bilateral investment 
treaties grant certain legal protections to non-governmental organizations).  
Whether, treaty, custom, or general principles will the most pertinent source will 
depend on the nature and scope of a given grant agreement.  
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expanse in World Bank grants.  Up until July 2006, the 
arrangements that governed the numerous grants made by the 
World Bank took multiple forms, ranging from lengthy loan look-
alikes to sparse letter arrangements that were more in the nature of 
gentlemen’s agreements.146  Under pre-July 2006 practices, most 
grant arrangements the World Bank entered into with grant 
recipients contained a basic set of provisions, regardless of whether 
the World Bank was acting as a grantor of its own funds, as a 
grantor of IDA funds, or as a trustee.  Those provisions spell out 
the respective responsibilities of the Bank and the recipient in 
executing the grant.  They specify the objectives of the grant 
activities, the activities and expenditures that are eligible to be 
funded out of the grant proceeds, and the recipient’s obligations 
with regard to procurement of goods and services, contract 
administration, financial management, and auditing and progress 
reporting.147 
Under standard disbursement arrangements, the recipient 
receives the grant proceeds from the World Bank in increments, 
based on a written application indicating the expenditures for 
which the funds sought will be used. 148  Typically, a lump sum is 
made available to the recipient upon execution of the grant 
agreement with further transfers being made contingent on the 
recipient’s submission to the Bank of financial and progress reports 
as provided for in the grant agreement. 149 
Within this standard modus operandi there was some 
variation.  IDA grants, for example, and grants from the GEF, 
entered into solely with governments, were governed by means of 
a lengthy agreement that was modeled on an IDA Loan 
Agreement, with the repayment provisions removed.150  Those 
                                                     
146 Executive Directors of the World Bank, Information Note for Borrowers—
Sanctions Reform: Expansion of Sanctions Regime Beyond Procurement and Sanc-
tioning of Obstructive Practices, 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://siteresources 
.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1173795340221 
/SanctionsReformNoteBorrowers.pdf. 




150 The legal provisions governing a typical World Bank Loan Agreement 
appear in two main documents, a set of General Conditions and a project-specific 
Loan Agreement between the World Bank and the borrower.  See generally Head, 
supra note 137.  IDA and IBRD have separate General Conditions, which do not 
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agreements set out the express powers of the World Bank to 
suspend or cancel the grant in certain circumstances and included 
a provision for arbitration in the event of a dispute between the 
World Bank and the recipient, identical to the arbitration 
procedures the World Bank provides for in connection with its 
loans.151 
Grants made from trust funds were generally governed by a 
standard form Trust Fund Grant Agreement.152  That agreement 
did not contain any dispute resolution mechanism.153  Nor did it 
set out the express powers of the Bank to suspend grant 
disbursements or cancel the grant.154  Further, it was not used by 
most of the trust –funded global programs funded by partnerships, 
such as Cities Alliance.155  The global programs crafted their own 
template agreements on their own program-specific letterhead.  
Like the Bank’s standard trust fund grant agreement, the global 
programs’ agreements did not contain any dispute resolution 
provision. 156 
The Bank’s own grant programs, including the Development 
Grant Facility, Development Marketplace, the Institutional 
Development Fund, and the Small Grants Program, added further 
variety to this miscellany.  Only one of those programs, the Small 
Grants Program, contained a dispute resolution mechanism: a 
provision for UNCITRAL arbitration.157 
4.2.2. A Drive for Uniformity 
In 2006, the Bank embarked upon a drive for uniformity in its 
grant arrangements.  This drive was sparked in part by IDA’s 
switch to significant amounts of grant financing after the G-8 
Gleneagles meeting.  It was also spurred on by a separate and 
                                                                                                                        
differ materially from each other in respect of the provisions discussed in this 
Article. 
151 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, General 
Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements, Jan. 1, 1985, § 10.01.  
See Pre-1996 Model IDA Grant Agreement and Model GEF Full-Sized Grant 
Agreement (on file with author). 




156 An indicative sampling of pre-1996 Global Program Grant Agreements are  
on file with author. 
157 See Pre-1996 Small Programs Grant Agreement (on file with author). 
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unrelated development, the renewed emphasis on addressing 
fraud and corruption that former Bank President Paul Wolfowitz 
decided to make a central theme of his presidency, immediately 
upon taking office in March 2005.158  In an April 2006 speech, 
Wolfowitz outlined a three-prong strategy to address fraud and 
corruption which included expanding anti-corruption support to 
Bank borrowers, striving to minimize the risk of corruption in 
Bank-funded projects, and seeking input and coordination with all 
stakeholders.159  Subsequently, in August 2006, the Bank’s board of 
executive directors approved a package of reforms aimed at 
strengthening the Bank’s ability to combat fraud and corruption in 
Bank-financed projects.160  These reforms included introducing a 
set of Anti-Corruption Guidelines (“Guidelines”). 
The Guidelines set out a framework for sanctioning persons 
involved in fraud and corruption and obstructive practices aimed 
at preventing the detection of fraud and corruption.  They also 
provided for amending the World Bank’s General Conditions for 
Loan Agreements so as to state expressly the contractual remedies 
the World Bank may invoke if fraud, corruption, or obstructive 
practices occur in the use of loan proceeds.161  The Guidelines were 
to be incorporated by reference into all of the World Bank’s loan 
                                                     
158 Wolfowitz resigned in June 2007.  On June 25, 2007, the Executive 
Directors unanimously selected former United States Trade Representative Robert 
B. Zoellick as the 11th Bank President.  Press Release, IBRD, Press Release 
Regarding the Selection of Mr. Robert B. Zoellick as President of the World Bank, 
IBRD Doc. 2006/481/EXT (June 25, 2007), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/GHI5BFNLR0.  Work on the Bank’s governance and 
anticorruption initiative has continued in spite of Wolfowitz’s resignation.  For 
more information on the Bank’s anti-corruption efforts, see J. Nolan McWilliams, 
Tug of War: The World Bank’s New Governance and Anticorruption Efforts, 17 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1 (2007). 
159 Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, Good Governance and 
Development: A Time for Action (Apr. 11, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/13LNL85QD0). 
160 WORLD BANK GROUP, DEP’T OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY, IMPROVING 
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES: ANNUAL INTEGRITY REPORT 65 (2007), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources 
/fy07reportcomplete.pdf. 
161 WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ANTI CORRUPTION GUIDELINES AND SANCTIONS 
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agreements but the Board left open the question of whether these 
changes should also be applied to World Bank grants.162  Bank 
Management subsequently decided that the Guidelines should 
apply to all IDA and full-sized GEF grants. This was a predictable 
conclusion, given that the scale of such grants equates with the 
scale of World Bank loans.  It led to the creation of a new standard 
form grant agreement for IDA and GEF grants.  In an unfortunate 
expansion of its zeal to stamp out fraud and corruption, however, 
Bank management then decided that a set of standard terms and 
conditions, mirroring the model IDA and GEF grant agreement, 
should be used for all World Bank grants.  Implementing this 
decision meant dispensing with the many different arrangements 
being used to document World Bank grants and replacing them 
with a standard agreement built on a set of standard conditions 
applicable to all World Bank grants (“Standard Conditions”).163  
This approach ignored the great divergence in the size and scope 
of World Bank grants and in the size, capacity and resources of the 
grant recipients.   
Concerns about development aid funds falling into the hands 
of terrorists, or groups linked to terrorists, added further weight to 
the push for uniformity in the Bank’s grant arrangements.  Before 
the Bank’s introduction of the current Standard Conditions, the 
Bank routinely included a provision in its grant agreements 
requiring recipients to certify that no grant proceeds would be 
used to make payments prohibited by any sanctions regime in 
effect under a decision by the United Nations Security Council 
taken under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.164  In recent years, 
however, many donors of trust fund monies (among them the 
United States, Australia, and Canada) sought additional assurances 
that measures would be taken to prevent any part of their 
contributions from falling into terrorist hands.165  Such measures 
ultimately end up being reflected in provisions in the pertinent 
World Bank grant agreements, which impose stringent policing 
responsibilities on recipients. 
                                                     
162 Id. at n.1. 
163 World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144. 
164 Id. at art. III, § 3.06(b).  This provision is identical to a provision included 
in most trust-funded grant agreements prior to the adoption of the Standard 
Conditions. 
165 World Bank, Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism, http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/index.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
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4.2.3. Sticks and Sanctions 
The Standard Conditions afford the Bank sweeping powers to 
suspend or cancel a grant and to demand that a recipient refund a 
grant.  The World Bank may suspend disbursements of grant 
proceeds, for example, if the recipient is a government or is located 
within the territory of a country whose government has taken any 
action that would interfere with the execution of the project; if the 
recipient has failed to perform any obligation under the grant 
agreement; if the World Bank has suspended loans or IDA credits 
to the country where the grant is being executed; or if such country 
has ceased to be a member of the Bank.166  It may also suspend 
disbursement of grant proceeds if the recipient makes any material 
misrepresentation to the Bank with respect to the grant; if the 
recipient assigns any of its obligations under the grant agreement 
to a third party without the World Bank’s consent; or, in the case of 
a non-government recipient, if the recipient dissolves or undergoes 
a change in its legal character which, in the opinion of the World 
Bank, may adversely affect the recipient’s ability to carry out its 
obligations under the grant agreement.167 
The Bank may, in addition, cancel a grant if events leading to a 
suspension continue for thirty days or if it determines that mis-
procurement, fraud, or corruption has occurred.168  Mis-
procurement occurs if the goods or services being financed out of 
grant proceeds are procured in a manner which is inconsistent 
with the procurement procedures specified in the grant 
agreement.169  Fraud and corruption leading to cancellation occurs 
if, in the opinion of the World Bank, corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, 
or coercive practices were engaged in with respect to the grant 
either by the recipient or (in the case of grants made to non-
government recipients) by representatives of the member country 
in whose territory the grant is being executed, or by a sub-grantee 
without the recipient or pertinent member country government 
having taken timely and appropriate action, “satisfactory to the 
World Bank,” to remedy the situation.170  The Bank may demand 
that a recipient refund an amount of grant proceeds to the Bank if 
                                                     
166  World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144, art. IV, §§ 
4.02(a)–(d).  
167 Id. art. IV, §§ 4.02(e)–(h). 
168 Id art. IV, §§  4.03(a), (c). 
169 Id. art. IV, § 4.03(c). 
170 Id. 
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it determines that such amount was used in a manner inconsistent 
with the grant agreement.171 
4.2.4. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
The litany of possible wrongdoings warranting suspension of 
disbursements or cancellation of a grant by the Bank poses fertile 
ground for disputes to arise.  Furthermore, the wide-sweeping 
powers of the Bank to act unilaterally and the expansive reach of 
its powers (which may be invoked even when the perceived 
wrongdoer is not the recipient itself) mean that many different 
kinds of entities may be involved.  The broad nature of these 
powers increases the need for dispute management. 
The only dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the 
Standard Conditions is an ad hoc arbitration procedure which has 
been adopted in toto from the Bank’s lending operations. Under 
that procedure, either party to the grant arrangement may submit a 
claim which the parties have been unable to settle between 
themselves to arbitration.172  The arbitral tribunal is comprised of 
three arbitrators.173  All parties are given a hearing and each party 
bears its own costs and an equal share of the arbitral tribunal costs 
and of the arbitrators’ remuneration.174  The arbitrators decide by 
majority vote and all awards are final and binding on the parties.175   
Proceedings before the tribunal are exclusive; the arbitration 
provision expressly provides that any arbitration is in lieu of any 
other procedure for the settlement of controversies or claims 
between the parties arising out of the grant agreement.176  Parties 
may seek judicial enforcement of an arbitral tribunal award if the 
party against whom it has been issued has failed to comply within 
thirty days of entry of the award.177 
The deficiencies of this provision as the sole dispute resolution 
mechanism for the diverse universe of World Bank grant 
agreements are striking.  First, it provides no pre-arbitration steps.  
Ideally, a full blown mandatory arbitration provision should be the 
next to last resort (prior to suit for enforcement), not the sole means 
                                                     
171 Id. art. IV, § 4.05. 
172 Id. art. V, § 5.03. 
173 Id. art. V, § 5.03(b) 
174 Id. art. V, § 5.03(h) 
175 Id. art. V, §§ 5.03(f), (g)  
176 Id. art. V, § 5.03(i).   
177 Id. art. V, § 5.03(j) 
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for airing resolving differences. A comprehensive dispute 
resolution mechanism begins with a requirement for consultation 
and negotiation and then provides for follow up interim steps such 
as fact-finding, investigation and mediation, offering many ways of 
resolving differences or concerns before resorting to arbitration. 
Second, this provision flatly ignores the differences in 
capacities and resources between the World Bank and grant 
recipients and the total lack of capacity or resources of smaller 
grant recipients to initiate an arbitration proceeding.  Third, as 
mentioned previously, it provides no guidance on the law that an 
arbitral body would apply.  The lack of certainty on this issue 
could serve as a deterrent to parties who might otherwise avail of 
the process.  These deficiencies prompt consideration of an 
alternative approach, molded by the goals to be advanced  in 
providing for a dispute resolution mechanism and grounded in the 
distinct characteristics of World Bank grant agreements..   
4.3. Dispute System Design for World Bank Grants 
The common characteristics shared by all World Bank grants, 
whether large or small, to governmental or non-governmental 
parties, shape what an effective dispute resolution mechanism 
should look like.  Ultimately, all dispute resolution systems 
depend for their efficacy on the extent to which they take the 
interests of their users into account.178  These common 
characteristics include:  the likelihood that the grantor/grantee 
relationship will be a continuing one, a David and Goliath aspect 
to the grantor/grantee relationship, and a highly charged 
authorizing environment which makes foul ups very costly. 
4.3.1. Honoring the Continuing Nature of the Grant Relationship 
Given that the World Bank administers over seven hundred 
trust funds and global programs, there is ample scope for a 
recipient to receive multiple grants from the Bank in its capacity as 
trustee for several different funds, in addition to IDA grants and 
grants from the Bank’s own grant programs.  A small, short term 
                                                     
178 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, 
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 324 (5th ed. 2007) (adapting Stephen B. 
Goldberg, Jeanne M. Brett, & William L. Ury, Designing an Effective Dispute 
Resolution System, in DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON AND IRVINE ADR PRACTICE BOOK 
38–47 (J. Wilkinson ed., 1991)). 
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grant for a discreet activity will often lead to other grants and 
additional engagement between the World Bank and the recipient.  
Most grants, therefore, have the potential to be the first step in a 
multi-layered long-term relationship.  This characteristic has 
implications for the design of an appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism.  To the extent that grants frequently result in 
continuing relationships, this suggests that, as in all continuing 
relationships, disputes will be inevitable.  Accordingly, all World 
Bank grant arrangements merit the inclusion of a dispute 
resolution mechanism.  The stakes may be much higher than the 
amount of the grant suggests. 
4.3.2. Dealing with the David and Goliath Syndrome 
All recipients, whether they are a government or a community-
based non-governmental organization, are in a position of 
weakness relative to the World Bank.  Inevitably, the relationship 
is one of vulnerability. Competition for grant financing is fierce 
and the need for such grants far out paces the availability of grant 
resources.  Actual and potential recipients are readily replaceable. 
The relative vulnerability of recipients is increased by the 
World Bank’s sweeping powers to suspend or cancel a grant.  The 
Bank’s power to suspend a grant vests considerable discretion in 
the Bank.  As currently framed, the Bank acting unilaterally can 
decide whether a recipient has taken an action that is likely to 
interfere with the grant activity, or has made a material 
misrepresentation in connection with a grant or has undergone 
some change in its legal character likely to adversely affect the 
grant.179  Further, the Bank has extensive powers to determine that 
fraud, corruption, or the financing of an entity with suspect links to 
a terrorist group, has occurred.  Moreover, the economic incentives 
that may constrain the Bank from exercising these powers in a loan 
context (where the Bank may be adversely affected economically if 
it suspends or cancels a loan) do not exist to operate as a restraint 
on the exercise of such powers in the grant context. 
The implications of this vulnerability point to a number of 
considerations that should be taken into account in designing an 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism.  It suggests, for 
example, that the ideal mechanism would contain a range of 
procedure tailored to the nature of the dispute; an opportunity, in 
                                                     
179  World Bank Grant Agreement Standard Conditions, supra note 144, art. IV. 
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other words, for the parties to “fit the forum to the fuss.”180  A 
procedure suited to pursuing a concern about a qualification in an 
audited financial statement received from a recipient, for example, 
might differ significantly from the kind of procedure that would be 
appropriate to pursue strong evidence of embezzled funds. 
This vulnerability also suggests that serious consideration 
should be given to designing a system that provides for a 
sequenced set of procedures that vary according to the stage of the 
dispute.181  The first stage in such procedures would be notification 
and consultation and the process would only advance to final 
decision-making arbitration if a series of interim steps built into the 
process failed to resolve the dispute.182  Interim steps could include 
negotiation and mediation, but also some form of independent fact 
finding by an external third party, where the nature of the dispute 
(e.g., an allegation of embezzlement) warranted it.183  The 
advantage of including a fact-finding stage is that a fact-finding 
process, once completed, can establish a floor upon which 
mediation or negotiation can then proceed.184  Ideally, the dispute 
resolution mechanism would provide for the possibility of 
returning to mediation and/or negotiation at various stages in the 
process as the facts and merits unfold.185 
Mandatory arbitration procedures resulting in a final award 
would remain an essential part of any comprehensive dispute 
resolution mechanism as there is always the possibility that a 
dispute will arise that is not amenable to resolution by agreement 
between the parties.  Including multiple pre-arbitration 
procedures, however, would preserve arbitration as the process of 
last resort.186  Further, the arbitration procedures should clarify 
what law the arbitrators would apply. 
Finally, the inequality of stature and resources between the 
World Bank and grant recipients may also necessitate empowering 
recipients so as to strengthen basic due process rights and enable 
them to participate in dispute resolution in a meaningful way.  
                                                     
180 To borrow a phrase, see Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting 
The Forum To The Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide To Selecting An ADR Procedure, 10 
NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994). 
181 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 179, at 322. 
182 Id. at 323. 
183 Id. at 324–25. 
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Steps to empower grant recipients could include supplementing 
their skills to represent themselves and making resources available 
to them to do so. 
4.3.3. Respecting the Reality of Multiple Stakeholders in a Highly 
Charged Authorizing Environment 
The stakes are high for all stakeholders in World Bank grants, 
not only for the grant recipient.  The world of overseas 
development aid, like the world of philanthropy, does not operate 
in a benign environment.  The developing world is frequently 
blamed for its own plight.187  In the face of such prejudice, any 
hiccup in the proper use of development aid funds has the 
potential to have a devastating effect on the availability of grant 
funds for the future.  Official development aid is sensitive to 
taxpayer pressure and news of funding foul ups, however small in 
the scheme of things, can diminish public support.188  Other 
sources of such aid are also ultra-sensitive to bad news; all donors 
want to make a difference and have a very low tolerance for 
wasted funds.189  These realities augur for a dispute resolution 
mechanism that is transparent but also reasonably efficient so that 
damaging attention is confined to a limited time span and not 
dragged out indefinitely. 
In light of the sensitivities of this environment, it would also be 
imperative that any dispute resolution system be designed in 
consultation with representatives of all stakeholders.190  In this 
universe, this would include recipient representatives, including 
developing countries, international and regional organizations, 
and non-government organizations, in addition to the donors of 
aid.  Allowing for such participation in the design stage would 
maximize the likelihood that the aid system ultimately adopted has 
credibility with all stakeholders.191  A broad-based participation by 
stakeholders would also enhance the likelihood of compliance with 
the system’s outcomes because, once having participated in the 
                                                     
187 SACHS, supra note 3, at 81. 
188 Id. at 269. 
189 Id. 
190 Cathy A. Costantino & Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict 
Management Systems, in GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 178, at 330–31. 
191 Id. 
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system’s design, parties have a sense of ownership in both the 
process and its results.192 
5. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the distinct characteristics of World Bank grants 
point to the inclusion of some essential building blocks in the 
design of a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism for 
World Bank grants.  As a starting point, all such agreements 
should include a dispute resolution provision, coupled with a 
governing law clause.  In addition, the dispute resolution provision 
should afford parties multiple opportunities to resolve concerns 
before they ever reach the arbitration stage.  Finally, in recognition 
of the reality that World Bank grants implicate many more parties 
than the World Bank and the immediate recipient, it is imperative 
that any dispute resolution system adopted for such grants be 
broadly understood and endorsed.   
World Bank grants are now firmly established as a core part of 
overseas development aid.  Adopting a comprehensive dispute 
resolution mechanism for them would foster the collaborative and 
participatory approach to development that much of grant finance 
aims to achieve.  It would also break new ground in this evolving 
area of international finance and create a valuable precedent for 
other grantors, such as bilateral aid agencies, regional development 
banks and foundations, to follow.  Such a step would emphasize 
the importance of building a new paradigm that balances between 
the interests of governments, inter-governmental and non-
governmental actors in developed and developing countries, an 
equilibrium which the global economy exerts increasing pressure 
on all stakeholders to achieve. 
 
                                                     
192 Id. 
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